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Lawyers and Trust in Business Alliances
By George Dent*

Strategic business alliances (including joint ventures, licensing, franchises, dealerships, distributorships, and strategic investments)l are proliferating rapidly due
to many economic forces, including economic globalization, intensifying competition and the resulting need of businesses to speed up technological innovation
and to adjust faster to changing markets. This should be good news for lawyers:
business transactions require advice on legal compliance and the drafting and
negotiation skills of lawyers, and complex deals like strategic alliances might be
expected to consume an abundance of these services. 2
Unfortunately, many business people doubt that lawyers add value to strategic
alliances; they accuse lawyers of impairing the trust and cooperation needed for
a successful alliance. Accordingly, executives often admit lawyers to negotiations
as late as possible and even then minimize their role. Some alliances eschew
contracts altogether and consign lawyers to handling regulatory issues, which may
be minor. This treatment could be viewed as desirable: legal services are costs,
and efficiency is usually served when costs of economic activity are lowered. To
some extent, though, this abasement reflects a failure of lawyers that damages
not only their own wallets but also the quality of strategic alliances. Skillful
crafting of alliances can earn handsome legal fees while improving their operation
and profitability.
Corporate managers and finance scholars recognize this problem and it is discussed in business literature, but it is almost completely ignored by both
practitioner-oriented and scholarly law journals. This lacuna is especially troubling because similar problems with lawyers crop up in other areas, like marriage,
where trust and cooperation are needed. This Article attempts a first step in filling
the gap in the legal literature. Part I describes the distinctive nature of strategic
alliances. Part II discusses why strategic alliances pose unique problems for law*Schott-vanden Eynden Professor of Business Organizations Law, Case Western Reserve University
School of Law. The author thanks Bryan Adamson, Tamar Frankel, Raben Gordon, David Schoebrod,
and faculty workshops at Case Western Reserve University School of Law, and New York Law School
for their help.
l. The definition of "strategic alliance" is fuzzy. For example, a "syndicate" in which "admittedly
distinct firms agree by contract, or less formally, to coordinate services on a particular project" might
be deemed a strategic alliance (especially if it employs a contract and the firms work together repeatedly), or might not. Randall 5. Thomas eta!., Megafinns, 80 N.C. L REv. ll5, 123 (2001).
2. Strategic alliances typically entail much risk and, "[i]n general, the more legal risk there is, the
more necessary and valuable legal services are." Donald C. Langevoort &: Raben K. Rasmussen, Skewing
the Results: The Role of Lawyers in Transmitting Legal Rules, 5 S. CAL lNTERDlSC. L.j. 375, 377 (1997).

45

46

The Business Lawyer; Vol. 58, November 2002

yers. Part Ill considers how lawyers' negotiation tactics can enhance rather than
erode trust between the parties in alliances. Part IV suggests how lawyers can
draft substantive contract terms that foster trust and cooperation in alliances. Part
V explores how law schools and continuing legal education can train lawyers to
perform better not only in strategic business alliances but in all situations where
trust and cooperation are important.
DISTINCTIVE FEATURES OF STRATEGIC ALLIANCES
THE GROWING IMPORTANCE OF STRATEGIC ALLIANCES

Perhaps strategic alliances have always caused problems for lawyers but no one
noticed because alliances were too minor to merit much attention. That disregard
must end because of the growing importance of alliances. 3 Heightened competition, stemming partly from economic globalization, compels businesses to adapt
and to innovate faster, especially in technology; to expand the geographic scope
of their operations; and to cultivate new markets. Firms once obtained needed
inputs (i.e., needed goods and services) in two ways: make them within the firm,
or buy them in market transactions. 4 Now, both options are often unsatisfactory.
It may take too long or cost too much for a firm to develop its own knowledge
of unfamiliar national or product markets or of new technology. 5 It is also difficult
for large firms to allow skilled professionals the "independence, and entrepreneurship on which a [smaller] firm's special capabilities rest." 6
Market purchases may also be unsuitable for acquiring these skills from others.
First, market transactions are problematic for confidential information, including
valuable technology. 7 Second, market sales do not work well when the desired
performance of one or both parties is too vague, complex, or vicissi.tudinous to
3. See generally George W Dent, Jr., Gap Fillers and Fiduciary Duties in Strategic Alliances, 57 Bus.
LAw. 55, 62-65 (2001) (describing growth of strategic alliances).
4. See generally 0UVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES (1975) (dividing business activity between firms (which he calls "hierarchies") and markets); see also Ranjay Gulati, Does Familiarity
Breed Trttst? The Implication of Repeated Ties for Contractual Choice in Alliances, 38 ACAD. MGMT. J. 85,
87 (1995) (citation omitted) ("[l]n a world without transaction costs all activities would be carried
out as exchanges between units, and it is due to the failure of markets, or arenas of exchange, to allow
for many exchanges without prohibitively high governance costs that organizations come to exist.").
5. See Bob Tedeschi, What:S That Noise on the Internet? The Sound of Alliances Being Forged,
N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2.000, at H25 ("[S]topping to develop expertise in any given area is tantamount
to suicide.").
6. jOSEPH l. BADARACCO, jR., THE KNOWLEDGE LINK; How FIRMS COMPETE T!-!ROUGH STRATEGIC
ALLIANCES 104 (1991}; see also Joanne E. Oxley, Appropriability Hazards and Governance in Strategic
Alliances: A Ii·ansaction Cost Approach, l3 j.L. EcoN. & ORG. 387, 390 (1997) (explaining that joint
ventures reduce "the intensity of incentives," but not "to the same extent as in a fully integrated
structure (since parties to the transaction retain a degree of autonomy)").
7. Seejean-Francois Hennart, A Tmnsaction Costs Theory of Equity joint Ventures, 9 STRATEGIC MGMT.
]. 361, 365 (1988) ("If the seller were to provide ... information in order to educate the buyer on
the value of know-how for sale, he would, by revealing the information, be transferring the knowhow free of charge.") (citation omitted); Steven R. Salbu &: Richard A. Brahm, Strategic Considerations
in Designing ]oint Ventttre Contracts, 1992 CoLUM. Bus. L. REv. 253, 272 (1992) (explaining that
technology joint ventures "often involve the use of organizationally embedded knowledge or sophisticated technology that is difficult to exchange efficiently through arms-length market mechanisms").
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be spelled out in a contract. 8 Finally, sales work poorly when a major "relationspecific" asset (including human capital) is needed. 9 One who commits such an
asset is vulnerable to the buyer's refusal to pay the cost of the asset. 10 To avoid
this Scylla-or-Charybdis choice, "hierarchy and market are being replaced with
more connected, lateral forms of organization." 11
CONTRACTUAL GAPS IN STRATEGIC ALLIANCES

No contract is complete; "[a]ll contracts have gaps." 12 In some contracts, however-for a single sale of standard goods, for example-the gaps can be small
because the parties' duties are not complex. The seller's duty to deliver goods and
the buyers duty to pay for them can be described adequately without great detail.
Uncertainty arising from any gaps that remain is mitigated by the gap fillers in
article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, including resort to industry practice. 13
Thus, the exchange is automatically governed by an extensive set of default rules
unless the parties agree otherwise.
Inside firms the problem of defining duties is handled by hierarchy: the law of
business organizations clothes certain parties with authority over other agents of
the firm. A corporation, for example, is "managed by or under the direction of a
board of directors .... "14 Thus, the duties of corporate agents (including employees) are fixed largely by the principle, "obey the board and officers acting
with authority delegated by the board." Relationships among directors, officers,
and other corporate agents are further elucidated by case law. As a result, firms
can function with just a few brief documents (typically, a charter and by-laws)
supplemented by statutes and case law.
Drafting documents for firms and market transactions is facilitated by repeated
use of standard terms. 15 Using standard terms lowers drafting costs, which also
8. See WILUAMSON, supra note 4, at 20-24, 75.
9. See Bengt Holmstrom & john Roberts, The Boundaries of the Firm Revisited,]. EcoN. PERSP.,
Fall 1998, at 73, 74.
10. "The more specialized the investment, the lower its value in its next best use. This heightens
the risk of opportunistic behavior .... " Thomas M. Palay, Comparative Institutional Economics: The
Govemance of Rail Freight Contracting, 13]. LEGAL STUD. 265, 266 (1984).
11. Blair H. Sheppard & Marla Tuchinsky, Micro-OB and the Network Organization, in TRUST IN
ORGANIZATIONS: FRONTIERS OF THEORY AND RESEARCH 140, 141 (Roderick M. Kramer&: Tom R. Tyler
eds., 1996).
12. Thomas A. Smith, The Efficient Norm for Corporate Law: A Neotraditional Interpretation of Fiducia7y Duty, 98 MICH. L. REv. 214, 234 (1999); see Or. RSA No.6., Inc. v. Castle Rock Cellular, 840
E Supp. 770, 776 (D. Or. 1993), aff'd, 76 E3d 1003 (9th Cir. 1996) (recognizing that a very detailed
contract would be very long but still contain "loopholes"); Bengt Holmstrom, Moral Hazard in Teams,
13 BELL]. EcoN. 324 (1982) (declaring it impossible to write a contract with optimal incentives when
performance is hard to monitor).
13. U.C.C. section 2-202 provides that written contract terms "may be explained or supplemented
(a) by course of dealing or usage of trade .... "U.C.C. § 2-202 (2002).
14. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 14l(a) (2001).
15. See, e.g., Ronald]. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 94
YALE L.j. 239, 257 (1984) (stating that "the general contents of the [typical merger] agreement have
by now become pretty much standardized"); see also Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court:
Rethinking the Codes Search for Immanent Business Nonns, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1765 (1996) (discussing
standard contract terms promulgated by the U.S. grain industry).
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makes it cost effective to draft terms to cover contingencies that would be too
minor or remote to warrant attention in a one-shot deal. 16
The factors that simplify contracts for market transactions and firms are absent
in strategic alliances. Defining the parties' duties is complicated because, unlike
the market transaction, an alliance comprises not a single act but continuous
action over a long time. 17 Also, each side typically wants the others sustained
"best efforts"-a standard that is necessarily vague. 18 No Uniform Commercial
Code provides gap fillers for strategic alliances. Alliances usually link firms in
different industries or countries-indeed, a common motive for alliances is to
combine the strengths of firms from different industries or markets. In such cases,
though, the allies cannot rely on industry custom to fill gaps in their contract.
The utility of contracts is further diminished by problems of detecting and
proving a breach. A party often cannot determine whether its partner is exerting
its best efforts. Even if a party is certain that its partner is not giving its best efforts,
it may be unreasonably expensive or impossible to prove the breach to the satisfaction of a· court.
Unlike firms, strategic alliances generally eschew hierarchy. To prevent opportunism, partners often share control equally, but they then need devices to resolve
deadlocks. These devices must be designed so that neither party is tempted to
force a deadlock in order to reap one-sided benefits. If one partner is given dayto-day control, that power is usually restricted by giving the junior partner either
a veto in major matters or some other rights that make it costly for the senior
partner to ignore the wishes of the junior. 19 It may be desirable to discourage each
party from causing a termination that leaves the other with large sunk costs. 20 At
the same time, termination must be available as an escape from intolerable oppression by the other party.
Unlike market transactions, strategic alliances rarely reach a natural completion, so the allies' contract must define when and how the alliance can be dissolved. On Lhis point alliances resemble firms, but for firms there is a default rule
that in dissolution firm assets are auctioned off and any surplus is divided among
the owners according to their interests. 21 If one owner, however, wants to buy the

16. "If conduct will be frequent, the additional costs of designing rules-which are borne onceare likely to be exceeded by the savings realized each time the rule is applied." Louis Kaplow, Rt!les
Versm Standarcls: An Economic Analysis, 42 DuKE L]. 557, 621 (1992).
17. See josh Lerner & Robert P Merges, The Control of Technology Alliances: An Empilical Analysis
of the Biotechnology !ndl!Stly, 46]. INDUS. ECON. 125, 131-32 (1998) (stating that it often takes biotechnology joint ventures a decade or more to obtain FDA approval for their products).
lB. See id. at 132 (asserting the impossibility of precisely defining a desired "level of effort" or
"delivery of a specific innovation").
19. See infra text accompanying notes 190-91.
20. See TAMAR FRANKEL, TRUSTING AND NON-TRUSTING: lAW COMPARING BENEFITS, COST AND RISK
8 (Boston University School of Law Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 99-12, 1999) ("When
the relationship can be terminated without serious adverse effects, interdependence and verification
will be weak, and the parties are more likely to renege on their promises as more attractive opportunities come along."), available at http://wwwbu.edu/law/faculty/papers.
21. UNIF. P'SHIP ACT§ 38(1)(1914), 6 U.LA. 487 (2001) (providing that on dissolution any partner
who has not wrongfully dissolved may demand that the surplus (if any) be distributed "in cash"). "In
effect, this gives each partner the right to force a sale of the partnership assets .... "].DENNIS HYNES,
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firm's assets and cash out the others, disputes about fairness often arise. 22 In
strategic alliances an auction of assets or their division in kind is rarely feasible;
a buyout by one party is ·often the only workable solution. Complicated provisions
for fair disposition of the assets and division of any surplus are needed. 23
Little statutory or case law supplies default rules for strategic alliances. True
joint ventures are generally treated as partnerships subject to the Uniform Partnership Act, 24 but many of its provisions are ill suited to joint ventures. 25 Many
so-called joint ventures are incorporated and thus subject to corporation law. 26
Joint venture corporations, however, are neither public companies nor typical
close corporations with individual shareholders who are concerned about their
employment in the corporation and their treatment on death, disability, or retirement27 And neither partnership nor corporation law applies at all to dealerships,
distributorships, licensing, or franchises.
Some strategic alliances are repeat transactions for at least one party. For example, some firms have many franchises. It makes sense for these firms to draft
a detailed standard-form franchise contract because the drafting costs are
stretched over many transactions. This, however, is an exception. Many alliances
are distinctive and require specially drafted terms.
In sum, alliances are complex relationships with few statutes, cases, or
standard-form models to govern them. Because their contracts have major gaps,
allies must rely heavily on trust.
THE IMPORTANCE OF TRUST IN STRATEGIC ALLIANCES

Some trust between the parties is necessary for virtually any contract: no one
deals with a person who threatens to cheat on and breach a contract wheneve.r it
AGENCY, PARTNERSHIP, AND THE LLC IN ANUTSHELL§ 94 (1997). Similarly, for corporations any surplus
is divided pro rata among the shareholders. See HARRY G. HENN & jOHN H. ALEXANDER, lAws OF
CORPORATIONS§ 382 (3d ed. 1983).
22. See fRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION lAW § 7.4.1 (2000) (discussing problems of
freezeouts).
23. "Termination clauses were treated as very imponant by lawyers. In a typical agreement document, approximately 80 percent of the joint-venture agreement's content was devoted to questions of
who would buy out whom, at what price, and who would act as a source to whom after the venture
terminated." KATHRYN RUDIE HARRIGAN, STRATEGIES FOR]O!NT VENTURES 365 (1985).
24. In both the Uniform Partnership Act section 6(1) and Revised Uniform Partnership Act section
101(6) "partnership" is defined as "an association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit." UNlF. P'SHIP ACT§ 6(1) (1914), 6 U.L.A. 393 (2001); UN!F. P'SH!P Ao § 101(6) (1997), 6
U.L.A. 61 (2001). "[T]he joint venture, if distinguished from a pannership at all, must be categorized as a
business association similar to the pannership but more narrow in purpose and scope." HAROLD GILL REusCHLEIN &WIWAM A. GREGORY, THE lAW OF AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP 451 (2d ed. 1990).
25. Examples are the rules that any partner may dissolve at any time and, unless otherwise agreed,
require an auction of partnership assets. UNIF. P'sHJP Ao §§ 31(l)(b), 31(2) (1914), 6 U.L.A. 370
(2001)); see also supra note 21 and accompanying text.
26. See 1 RICHARD 0. HARROCH, PARTNERSHIPS & ]OINT VENTURE AGREEMENTS§ 2.09(2), at 2-75
(discussing "joint venture corporations").
27. Strategic investments in corporations are also ill suited to the usual rules for shareholders.
Strategic investments somewhat resemble venture capital investments, but these, too, require complex
contracts. (For sample documents, see 1 MICHAEL j. HALLORAN ET Al., VENTURE CAPITAL AND PuBLIC
OFFERING NEGOTIATION (3d ed. 2000).) Moreover, unlike venture capitalists, most strategic investors
are interested in the investee as a supplier and not just as a financial investment, so model venture
capital contracts are also unsuitable for them.
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profits him to do so. 28 The degree of trust needed in contracts varies widely,
though. Where performances can be stipulated without substantial gaps and legal
enforcement of the contract will largely compensate the victim of any breach, trust
is not very important. This is true of many consumer transactions, for example,
in which buyer and seller know almost nothing about each other.
These conditions do not prevail for most strategic alliances. If a party pledges
its best efforts to develop new technology in a venture requiring large sunk costs,
for example, the partner may be unable to prove a breach of that promise and to
obtain a complete remedy for its injury Accordingly, parties will not contract at
all unless they already have some mutual trust.
Moreover, because their duties are often amorphous, each party will constantly
monitor the other. If one party thinks the other has violated their trust, the former
can often slacken in its own performance without risking a lawsuit because of the
problems of legal enforcement, or the offended party may simply terminate the
alliance. Thus there must be trust not only at the birth of an alliance but throughout its life. Reliance on trust is not irrational, though it may seem so to lawyers
accustomed to getting everything in writing. In our personal lives we trust people
we know or who are part of a network to which we belong. Strategic alliances
follow this principle. 29 Lacking such a connection, a firm may base trust on its
partner's reputation and evident concern to maintain that reputation. 30
Although a contract cannot create initial trust, the process of negotiating a
contract can either enhance or erode trust. Also, contract terms can nurture conditions to maintain and expand trust. Lawyers can be key figures in both of these
respects. Moreover, "investors react more favorably to the announcements of jointventures between parents in dissimilar businesses." 31 Because trust is likely to be
lower in such cases, contracts are more important there, so lawyers' skills can be
most important in these potentially most valuable alliances.
THE DEFINITION OF TRUST

A definition of trust may seem superfluous; everyone knows what trust is. Commentators disagree, however, about its definition, so some discussion is in order.
To some, trust excludes all calculation; it is what is commonly called blind
trust. Oliver Williamson says: "Calculative trust is a contradiction in terms." 32
28. See FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, TRUST: TriE SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE CREATION OF PROSPERITY
25 (1995).
29. See Ranjay Gulati, Alliances and Nctworlzs, 19 STRATEGIC MGMT.]. 293,294 (1998) (explaining
that when initiating new alliances, firms "turned to their existing relationships first [or potential
partners or sought referrals from them on potential partners"); see also id. at 296 (providing that
members o[ a network are likely to have congruent attitudes, "a shared understanding o[ the utility
o[ certain behavior").
30. See Lisa Bemstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation Through
Rules, Nonns, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REv. 1724, 1745-62 (2001).
31. Srinivisan Balakrishnan &. Mitchell P Koza, Information Asymmetry, Adverse Selection and joint
Ventttres: Theory and Evidence, 20 ]. EcoN. BEHAV. &. 0RG. 99, lll (1993).
32. Oliver E. Williamson, Calwlativeness, Trust, and Economic Organization, 36 j.L. &. EcoN. 453,
463 (1993).
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Only a fool, however, makes a contract based solely on blind trust. 33 Williamson
would therefore banish the concept of trust from economic analysis and talk
instead of risk and devices that mitigate risk enough to allow reasonable people
to contract. Williamson:S terminology is logical, but it conflicts with common
usage. Trust is usually defined as comprising several levels of risk-taking, and the
lowest is often called calculative trust. It relies on legal sanctions for breach; it
assumes only that the other party is rational and, therefore, will perform in order
to avoid these sanctions. 34
Because of the difficulty of specifying duties and proving breaches and the
potential for great injury from breach, strategic alliances cannot depend on legal
sanctions; greater trust is needed. The kind of alliance that is feasible depends on
the depth of the parties' trust. Some alliances can function with an intermediate,
or "semi-strong," level of trust which relies on extra-legal economic sanctions, like
the loss of future business with the victim or the loss of future business with third
parties because of damage to the breacher's reputation. 35
In some cases, though, the potential gains from opportunism (and the injury
to the victim) exceed the total legal and extra-legal economic sanctions for breach.
This is so, for example, when a party does not rely on its reputation or a breach
is so difficult to prove and publicize that it would not damage the breacher's
reputation. In such cases a deeper trust based on shared values and mutual concern is needed to forge an a1liance. 36 Even this "norm-based trust" 37 is not blind
trust devoid of calculation-the only true trust to Williamson. Norm-based trust
typically stems from scrutiny of the partner in past dealings with ones self and
inquiry about its dealings with others as well as the parties' concerns about legal
sanctions and their reputations and their hopes for future dealings with each other.
Semi-strong and norm-based trust so differ from reliance on legal sanctions alone
that it seems apt to give them a different name and to choose "trust" as that name.
Even a high level of trust does not assure maximum cooperation. Few firms
will accept large losses just to maintain a partner's trust. This is one reason why
most alliances eventually terminate. The costs and benefits of opportunism, how-

33. See Gulati, supra note 29 and accompanying text.
34. Sheppard&: Tuchinsky, supra note 11, at 144 (saying that "[i]n the market, the traditional form
of deterrence is the courts"). In addition, though, legal sanctionS can include private arrangements,
like a bond that is forfeited in the event of breach.
35. See Mari $ako, Does Tru.1t Improve Business Perjonnance?, in TRUST WITHIN AND BETWEEN ORGANIZATIONS: CONCEPTUAL IsSUES AND EMPIRICAL APPLICATIONS 88, 91 (Chrtstel Lane &: Reinhard
Bachmann eds., 1998).
36. See id. (referring to "a set of internalized norms and principles that guide the behavior of
exchange partners").
37. See Christel Lane, Introduction: Theories and Issues in the Study of Tmst, in TRUST WITHIN AND
BETWEEN ORGANIZATIONS: CONCEPTUAL ISSUES AND EMPIRICAL APPLICATIONS, supra note 35, at 1,
8-10 (referring to "value-" or "norm-based trust"); see also Sako, supra note 35, at 91 (referring
to "strong-form" trust); Mari Sako &: Susan Helper, Detem1inants of Tmst in Supplier Relations:
Evidence from the Automotive Industry in japan and the United States, 34]. EcoN. BEHAV. & ORG.
387, 390 (1998) (referring to "goodwill trust"); Sheppard & Tuchinsky, supra note ll, at 145
(referring to "identification-based trust" which "assumes that one party has fully internalized the
other's preferences").
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ever, are often unclear, and in such cases trust can induce cooperation and compliance where the parties might otherwise choose to defect.
Though a low level of trust may suffice to create an alliance, higher trust may
still enhance its value. Often partners begin small, commensurate with a low level
of trust. As trust grows they take greater risk by expanding the venture and
dropping costly or restrictive measures (like closely monitoring each other) that
now seem unnecessary: "Successful alliances ... evolve through a sequence of
learning-reevaluation-readjustment cycles .... "38 This is true of economic transactions in generaP 9 The challenge for allies, then, is first to establish enough trust
to begin an alliance and then to develop that trust so that the alliance can grow
to maximum profitability. The challenge for lawyers is to facilitate this process.

THE PROBLEM OF LAWYERS IN STRATEGIC ALLIANCES
OUR CURRENT IGNORANCE

Any discussion of lawyers in business transactions suffers from a dearth of
knowledge. Robert Gordon says we lack "thorough, systematic descriptions and
reflective analyses of what it is that corporate lawyers actually do. "40 The few
studies of negotiation of deals examine contract terms, not "negotiation as a means
of establishing and growing long-term relationships." 41 The imbalance is significant because of the unique qualities of negotiating in a relationshipY This Article
tackles our ignorance by adding to the little existing scholarship lessons drawn
from other fields and information from lawyers and business people active in
alliances. Our knowledge remains rudimentary. though, so the analysis here is
tentative and will require revision as understanding grows.

38. Yves L Doz, The Evolution of Cooperation in Strategic Alliances: Initial Conditions or Leaming
Processes?, 17 STRATEGIC MGMT. j. 55, 64 (1996); see also Susan Helper et al., Pragmatic Collaborations:
Advancing Knowledge While Controlling Opportunism, 9 INDUS.&: CORP. CHANGE 44 3, 4 75 (2000) (many
alliances start small, then expand); Walter W Powell, Trust-Based Forms of Governance, in TRUST IN
ORGANIZATIONS: FRONTIERS OF THEORY AND RESEARCH, supra note 11, at 51, 60 ("The process is
iterative-the level of cooperation increases with each agreement between the same partners .... ").
39. See Rachel E. Kranton, The Formation of Cooperative Relationships, 12 j.L ECON. &: 0RG. 214,
227 (1996) ("[l]ndividuals begin cooperative exchange relationships at low levels of exchange. As
partners fulfill their exchange obligations, cooperation rises to higher levels."). It is also true of strategic
alliances in particular. "[M]any joint ventures occur as options to expand in the future and are interim
mechanisms .... " Gulati, supra note 29, at 299; see also Edward H. Lorenz, Neither Friends Nor
Strangers: Informal Networks of Subcontracting in French IndHStry, in TRUST: MAKING AND BREAKING
COOPERATIVE RELATIONS 194, 207 (Diego Gambetta ed., 1988) (explaining that customers in French
mechanical engineering industry gave new suppliers short contracts; once satisfied with performance,
customers gave longer contracts).
40. Robert W Gordon, Lawyers, Scholars, and the "Middle Ground," 91 MICH. L. REv. 2075, 2088
(1993); see also KarlS. Okamoto, Reputation and the Value of Lawyers, 74 OR. L. REv. 15, 17 n.S (1995)
("Looking at what corporate lawyers do is something legal academics have, with few exceptioi-ts, failed
to do.").
41. Sheppard &: Tuchinsky, mpra note ll, at 154.
42. Id. at 161.
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THE BEHAVIOR OF LA WYERS IN NEGOTIATIONS

Client complaints about lawyers are as old as the legal profession itself,
and business clients have long swelled the critique. They accuse lawyers of
inflating their bills by harping on trifles and of failing to understand the client's
business needs or to explain what they do or why they do it. 43 In the context
of strategic alliances further criticisms are leveled. Business people complain
that many proposed ventures fall through because lawyers are too cautious 44
and adversarial: 45 "[M]any businesspeople are more at ease without lawyers in
the room, more confident about getting things accomplished while preserving
the goodwill between the parties. They rail at the negative attitudes lawyers
exhibit, seeing a problem behind every bush, overcompensating to avoid risk,
generating conflict." 46
LAW VERSUS TRUST?

The preceding discussion suggests that in negotiating alliances all problems
with the role of lawyers stem from their improper attitudes. The source of trouble,
however, may be more fundamental: the role of law itself in strategic alliances is
problematic. Lawyers assume that carefully drafted contracts enhance commercial
transactions. The ideal contract covers all issues down to the point where the
importance of a contingency and the odds of its occurrence are so low that the
costs of drafting, negotiating, monitoring, and enforcing a clause to handle that
contingency exceed the value the clause would add to the transactionY
Where trust is crucial, however, the existence of a detailed contract and the
process of its negotiation may both be detrimental. This principle is most valid
in intimate relationships, like marriage. It would be technically difficult to draft
43. See generally Kenneth R. Margolis, The COSE Study: A Report on Small Business Client Satisfaction with the Delivery of Legal Services (1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author);
Debra H. Snider, Enough Is just Enough, CoRP. COUNSEL, Oct. 17, 2001, at 57 (describing beliefs of
business people that lawyers are guilty of "overlawyering" and should pay more attention to cost
efficiency and the clients "business objectives").
44. David Ernst & Stephen I. Glover, Strategic Alliances: Combining Legal and Business Practices To
Create Successful Strategic Alliances, INSIGHTS, Oct. 1997, at 6 (providing that when negotiating strategic
alliances the instincts of lawyers to minimize risk clashed with the instincts of business people to take
risk); see also Sarah Reed, Doing Documents vs. Doing Deals: A Lawyer Confronts a Venture Capitalist;
Bus. LAw TODAY, Sept./Oct. 2001, at 13, 14 ("[T]he lawyer and the venture capitalist, by professional
predilection, could not be more unlike .... [T]he lawyers job is to minimize the downside, the
venture capitalists job is to maximize the upside.").
45. HARRIGAN, supra note 23, at 363.
46. jAMES C. FREUND, SMART NEGOTtATING: How TO MAKE GOOD DEALS IN THE REAL WoRLD 186
(1992); see Ernst & Glover, supra note 44, at 6 (stating that lawyers' inclinations may clash with the
parties' desire to establish a long-term cooperative relationship).
47. See GEORGE G. TRtANTJS, THE EFFICIENCY OF VAGUE CONTRACT TERMS 6 (Univ. ofVa. School of
Law 2002 Law & Econ. Research Papers Series, Working Paper No. 02-7, 2002) (stating that contract
terms may be omitted if the cost of "specifYing" some condition or of verifying its existence to a court
would exceed the gains from the term), available at httpJ/ssm.com/abstract_id = 311886; ERIC RAsMUSEN, A MODEL OF NEGOTtATJON, NOT BARGAINING: EXPLAINING INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS 39 Qohn
M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ., & Bus., Discussion Paper No. 324, 2002) (discussing costs of reading
contract proposals), available at http://www.law.Harvard.edu/programs/olin-center/.
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terms to cover even the bigger issues that all married couples face, and the very
effort to do so would intrude a legalism at odds with the love that good marriages
require. 48 It is generally better to rely on the spouses' mutual love and care instead
of a contract to resolve issues as they arise.
Whether this principle applies to business alliances is debatable: "There is a
fundamental disagreement [between those who regard legal contracts] as an alternative mechanism of control which undermines trust [and those for whom]
legal regulation of business relations is an important precondition for trust as it
makes business relations more predictable and less risky"-+ 9
Some believe that it does:
First, legalistic remedies [e.g., formal contracts] can erode the interpersonal
foundations of a relationship ... because they replace reliance on an individuals "good will" with objective, formal requirements .... Second, ...
rules and procedures ... can disrupt ... "implicit agreements" ... by interposing a structural barrier between the parties, making the relationship feel
less direct and close. 50
Some firms exclude lawyers altogether 51 and form alliances with no written contract at all. 52 Others, less extreme, stress "the increasing impact and importance
of ethics and the declining significance of contract law as one moves toward
relational exchange. "53
Others say a good contract gives partners a security necessary to accept the
risks of contributing enthusiastically to the alliance. We can't know how much
alliances are hampered by faulty contracts, but we know most alliances fail even
though the parties at first expect success 54 Although Jordan Lewis lists some
alliances that omitted a formal contract, he concedes they are exceptions where
the parties had already "developed enough comfort .... In other situations, contracts can be a source of comfort that the fundamentals have been nailed down. "55
In many alliances partners do not rigorously enforce their contract. Indeed, to
enforce contract rights to the letter may connote a lack of trust in ones partner
that will undermine the partners willingness to trust and cooperate. Partners often
agree "to make many adjustments, and ignore minor deviations in ways not re48. See jOHN D. CALAMARI & jOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE lAW OF CONTRACTS 30 (4th ed. 1998)
(many courts refuse to enforce spousal contracts because, inter alia, "suits would interfere with
family harmony").
49. See Lane, supra note 37, at 25.
50. Sim B. Sitkin & Nancy L. Roth, Explaining the Limited Effectiveness of Legalistic "Remedies"for
TrusUDistrust, 4 0RG. SCI. 367, 376 (1993).
5l. jORDAN D. LEWIS, TRUSTED PARTNERS: How COMPANIES BUILD MUTUAL TRUST AND WIN TOGETHER 261 (1999).
52. See id. at 263 (listing some examples).
53. Gregory T. Gundlach & Patrick E. Murphy, Ethical and Legal Foundations of Relational Marketing
Exchanges,]. Mktg., Oct. 1993, at 35, 40.
54. See Tarun Khanna et al., The Dynamics of Learning Alliances: Competition, Cooperation, and Relative Scope, 19 STRATEGIC MGMT.]. 193, 193-94 n.l (1998) (citing studies finding failure rates of up
to eighty percent for strategic alliances); see also Ernst & Glover, supra note 44, at 12 ("the average
life span of a joint venture is about seven years").
55. LEWIS, supra note 51, at 263.
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quired by their contract's written provisions, yet preserves their unfettered right
to insist on strict performance of their contract when they think their contracting
partner is behaving badly" 56
Contracts also have a norm-creating value. Most people feel a moral duty to
keep their promises even if they would not have felt obliged to behave the same
way in the absence of a promise. 57 Thus a contract may induce compliance wjth
its terms even if one does not expect that the other party would detect a breach
or try to enforce the contract in case of a breach.
Strong judicial enforcement of contracts also promotes success in alliances. It
facilitates "new relationships between firms and their customers" and "encourage[s] entrepreneurs to try out new suppliers" and suppliers to extend credit more
readily 58 To extend the analogy to marriage, the law imposes a mandatory contract
that assures each spouse of physical and material security both wjthin the marriage
and in the event of its termination. Withdrawjng this assurance would deter prudent people either from marrying at all or from making the kind of commitments
that help a marriage to succeed. 59 In business, legal backing can offer "preventive
regulation" and punish violators so as to supply the "verification and proof of
trustworthiness" often needed to make a deal possible 60
Between the two extremes, some think that legalistic devices produce some
desirable and some undesirable consequences 61 ln this view the ideal level of
detail in an alliance contract would depend on both the degree of trust between
the allies and the goals and proposed mode of operation of their enterprise. 5 2
THE AWKWARD ROLE OF LAWYERS

Because they doubt the value of both lawyers and contracts in strategic alliances, some business people bring in their lawyers late in the game. 63 One
56. Bernstein, supra note 30, at 1781; see Lane, supra note 37, at 13 ("[A]ctual use oflegal sanctions
... is incompatible with a trust relationship. Thus law and other social institutions are viewed as

mechanisms to coordinate expectations which make the risk of trust more bearable.").
57. Thus the sense of duty to comply with ones contracts is but one example of the sense of duty
to obey the law. See Tamar Frankel & Wendy]. Gordon, Introduction, 81 B.U. L. REv. 321, 323 (2001)
(discussing the norm-creating function of law).
58. SIMON jOHNSON ET Al., CoURTS AND RElATIONAL CoNTRACTS Qohn M. Olin Program in
Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 227, 2002), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id = 291802.
59. See MARY ANN GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAw: STATE, LAw, AND FAMILY IN
THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE 112 (1989) ("(A]s divorce increasingly came to be considered a right ... the situation of a married woman without income or resources of her own became
precarious indeed.").
60. Tamar Frankel, Trusting and Non-Trusting on the Internet, 81 B.U. L. REv. 457, 474 (2001); see
also Stephen Knack & Paul J. Zak, Building Trust: Public Policy, Interpersonal 7i-ust, and Economic Development (forthcoming) (manuscript at 3) (listing "formal institutions that enforce contracts" as one
of five elements that build trust), available at http://www.goldmark.org/iivia/misc/zak-trust.pdf.
61. See Sitkin &Roth, supra note 50, at 367 (claiming that legalistic remedies enhance task-specificreliability trust but not value-congruence trust).
62. See id. at 370-73 (arguing that the desirability of legalistic remedies depends on the
circumstances).
63. See FREUND, supra note 46, at 186 ("[M]any businesspeople avoid introducing lawyers into the
early stages of a deal when, in their view, what:S needed is nurturing-not disaster scenarios.").
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executive says that when negotiating deals with firms his company has dealt
with before "we don't bother to write detailed contracts. That would not only be
tedious but also an insult to our relationship. Sometimes we give our lawyers only
a few days to write up the contract, and that too after the project may already
have begun." 64
That attitude is not surprising. To develop trust, partners must get to know
each other. 65 A lawyer then is as distracting and unwelcome as a third party on a
honeymoon. Given lawyers' reputation among business people, their presence
may "suggest ... a reluctance to trust" on the part of the client. 56 Many partners
already have some knowledge and trust of each other. 5 7 Such cases may resemble
a happy marriage more than an ordinary commercial relationship so that hard
bargaining is inadvisable; trust is more easily destroyed than created. 68
Delaying the participation of lawyers in negotiations may backfire, though:
The most frequent answer explaining why announced joint ventures never
went beyond the discussion stage was that ventures were sunk by lawyers.
This explanation suggests that managers were homogeneous in their outlooks; lawyers were too adversarial. A more likely explanation for jointventure deaths at the contract-writing stage was that partners did not think
through their arrangements adequately before they reached the altar. The
probing questions the lawyers asked exposed these shortfalls in partners'
agreements, and the venture fell apart. 59
Macaulay quotes one lawyer: "businessmen when bargaining often talk only in
pleasant generalities, think they have a contract, but fail to reach agreement on
any of the hard, unpleasant questions until forced to do so by a lawyer." 70 This
oversight may stem not from neglect but from a "reluctance to cross swords di64. Gulati, supra note 4, at 95 (quoting a ~~nior manager for a computer software firm); see also
David Ernst & Steven Glover, Tttg of War: Combining Legal and Business Best Practice, ALUANCE ANALYST,
july 15, 1997, at 39 ("[MJany executives believe best practice is keeping the legal team away from the
negotiation for as long as possible.").
65. See Gulati, sttpra note 4, at 86; see also Jorg Sydow, Understanding the Constitution of lnterorganizational 1i"U.St, in TRUST WlTHlN AND BETWEEN 0RGANlZATlONS: CONCEPTUAL [SSUES AND EMPlRlCAL
APPUCATlONS, supra note 35, at 46 (stressing importance of personal contact between the parties).
66. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustwortl1iness, and the Behavioral Foundations of
Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 1735, 1806 (2001).
67. See Gulati, supra note 29, at 294.
68. See Blair & Stout, supra note 66, at 1776. Not all business firms eschew hard bargaining in
strategic alliances, though. Some firms seem to reward each manager based on "the toughness of the
deals that he negotiates." Lerner & Merges, supra note 17, at 153. In the biotechnology industry many
alliances are heavily negotiated. !d. at 135. Indeed, in order to extract greater control, firms offering
financing sometimes deliberately "protract[edl negotiations until the R&D firm was in a financial
crisis." ld. at 152. It is unclear how common such behavior is and whether it is concentrated in certain
industries or types of transactions.
69. HARRlGAN, supra note 23, at 363.
70. Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in BLLSiness: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. Soc. REv.
55, 59 (1963); see also FREUND, supra note 46, at 186 (saying that the critique of lawyers is in some
ways "a bum rap. Businesspeople . . often pass over a number of the potential issues lurking in most
transactions. The lawyer comes in and poses some logical questions."); LEWIS, supra note 51, at 262
(explaining that lawyers may be blamed for disagreements because they "raise issues management did
not address").
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rectly with a counterpart who will be working closely with the principal once the
relationship is established."71 Lawyers who will not be part of that ongoing relationship can discuss issues that may be too sensitive for the business people.
Some terms that lawyers value but that business people deprecate "are in fact
underpinned by important business considerations." 72
Similarly, lawyers can help clients be objective and pragmatic. People often
exaggerate their own merits. A client may overrate its own contribution and,
therefore, underestimate the concessions needed to reach agreementn In market
transactions comparison with similar deals imposes a reality check on inflated
expectations. Most alliances are distinctive deals that lack such bases for comparison, so a gimlet-eyed outsider can be useful, especially for a party with little
experience in alliances. 74
A lawyer can also protect a client from the excessive trust when partners "overidentify."75 A lawyer need not counsel clients to be suspicious or skeptical but can
simply point out that most alliances eventually deteriorate, 76 and then the once
friendly parties often start to play roughn The lawyer can prescribe contract terms
to avoid the causes and bad consequences of failure. The client may choose to
assume a risk rather than seek a provision to avoid it, but at least then the client
has pondered the problem rather than having naively overlooked it.
The importance of independence and objectivity also suggests how outside
counsel may be superior to house counsel in negotiating strategic alliances. Because outside counsel is outside, its broaching and negotiation of unpleasant
issues may not be imputed to the client by the other party as it would be if done
by house counseL By negotiating alliances for several clients, outside counsel can
acquire broader experience than in-house lawyers. This experience may give outside counsel both better judgment and greater credibility with business people
than house counsel has. As a full-time employee of the client, house counsel may
flinch, either deliberately or unwittingly, from giving advice the business people
don't want to hear. Outside counsel may be bolder.
71. FREUND, supra note 46, at 176; see also HARRIGAN, supra note 23, at 363 (saying that many
business "managers found the act of writing contracts unpleasant"). The parties could choose as
negotiators business people who will not later be involved with the alliance, but that would be unwise:
"There is only one way to develop an alliance if you expect superior performance: Have the implementers be the negotiators. It is always a mistake to assign these phases to different people." LEWls,
supra note 51, at 27.
72. Reed, supra note 44, at 14.
73. See Margaret A. Neale &: Max H. Bazerman, Perspectives for Understanding Negotiation: Viewing
Negotiation as a judgmental Process, 29]. CONFLICT RESOL 33, 46-47 (1985).
74. See FREUND, supra note 46, at 176 (stating that bargaining through an agent may be beneficial
in part because of "the principals emotional involvement in a high-stakes deal, which hampers his
ability to negotiate effectively").
75. Roderick M. Kramer et aL, Collective Trust and Collective Action: The Decision to 1i-ust as a Social
Decision, in TRUST IN ORGANIZATIONS: FRONTIERS OF THEORY AND REsEARCH, supra note ll, at 357,
380. In such cases one can be too lenient and fail to question ones partners even when they are
wrong. See id. at 380-82.
76. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
77. See Blair H. Sheppard, Negotiating in Long-Tem1 Mutually Interdependent Relationships Among
Relative Equals, in 5 RESEARCH ON NEGOTIATIONS IN ORGANIZATIONS 35-36 (Robert]. Bies eta!. eds.,
1995) (listing some aggressive practices pursued in some relational contract situations).
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Even if the executives negotiating a deal plan to take part in its implementation,
they usually expect to be involved for a limited time. Accordingly, they may disregard issues unlikely to arise at the start of the alliance. Like a Ponzi scheme,
though, an alliance may project an illusion of success that explodes only after
some time. During negotiations, then, lawyers may have to persuade reluctant
business people to focus on these issues.
Further, it is not only typical but fitting that business people should be more
optimistic than their lawyers about deals. All deals pose risks that will be taken
only by those who predict success, so business people tend to be sanguine about
their deals. Pride of authorship bolsters their optimism. Lawyers tend to identify
with their clients, but the lawyers' greater distance from the deal tempers their
vicarious optimism. Further, the role of lawyers, as emphasized in their training,
is to induce caution by spotting problems. Some tension between lawyers and
their business clients, then, is natural and desirable and not just a result of
bad lawyering.
The critique of business lawyers may be exaggerated but it poses a public
relations problem. Clearly business lawyers must do better in explaining their
work and their bills to clients. The problem is not just one of perceptions, though;
the critique has a lot of truth. Overlawyering, excessive pugnacity of lawyers, and
their failure to understand clients' business objectives are especially problematic
in strategic alliances. Even before entering law school, future lawyers are imbued
with our culture's image of lawyers as aggressive advocates for their clients. The
media usually show lawyers as litigators engaged in legal combat. They are often
portrayed as unscrupulous. Even the heroic lawyer is a gladiator sent forth to
vanquish the opposing party.
Lawyers are taught to be careful and thorough, to dot all i's and cross all t's.
Hourly billing gives lawyers an incentive to find more issues requiring negotiation
and drafting. 78 Cognitive biases reinforce this tendency: "People (like lawyers)
who are paid to worry will find something to worry about." 79 Lawyers also fear
that if they make a concession by omitting a term and trouble later arises because
of the omission, the client will blame the lawyer.so Clients may consider this
conduct expensive nitpicking, but it t;;;enerally won't bother the other party. In
negotiating an alliance, however, a lawyer's endless carping may erode the trust
and cooperation the parties want to cultivate.
Legal education exacerbates these problems. Most law school courses employ
the case method which uses actual or hypothetical lawsuits. All students simulate
litigation in moot court. Even courses on transactions or alternative dispute resolution hardly alter the model of the lawyer as hatchet man. In these contexts
78. See Langevoort &. Rasmussen, supra note 2, at 389-93 (showing how hourly billing encourages
overlawyering).
79. Id. at 425.
80. See Edward Bernstein, Law & Economics and the Structure of Value Adding Contracts: A Contract
Lawyers View of the Law & Economics Literature, 74 OR. L. REv. 189, 235-36 (1995); Langevoort &.
Rasmussen, 5Upra note 2, at 427-28 (showing how hindsight bias causes clients unjustly to blame the
lawyer).
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lawyers are told to be less adversarial and pursue agreement with the other party.
One may seek agreement, however, not by winning the other:S friendship but by
aggressive tactics like intimidation. 81 In general, law students "are trained to
question, doubt, to be adversarial, to be independent, to be competitive, and
to think win-lose. At or near their extremes, each and all of these concepts
can and often do work at cross purposes to earning, building, and maintaining
trusting relationships. "82
The bar encourages lawyers to act like hired guns by making them responsible
almost solely to the client, who is to be represented "with zeal. "83 The lawyer may
not even reveal a client:S criminal conduct except in case of imminent bodily
harm. 84 Like a hardened soldier returning to civilian life from a savage war, the
lawyer steeped in the doctrine that "winning isn't everything; it's the only thing"
cannot easily adjust to a situation like a strategic alliance where success in negotiation demands fostering trust ami cooperation with another party.
Ironically, business people who exclude lawyers until late in negotiations because they dislike lawyers' pugnacity may exacerbate that pugnacity. Latecomer
lawyers lack the personal trust and friendship the business people have already
cultivated. Accustomed to a bigger role in deals, lawyers arriving at the last minute
may feel slighted and threatened and try to re-assert their importance by being
even more aggressive than usual.
Excluding the lawyers until the last minute may also result in a bad deal for
one or both sides. Squeezed for time and stuck with terms already settled by the
business people, the lawyers may not be able to craft suitable terms. A bad contract
may not injure both sides equally. A firm that has little experience with alliances
may accept terms with problems it is not aware of. 85 If their late-arriving lawyers
enlighten them, they may still feel foreclosed from renegotiating those terms, even
if additional terms could increase the value of the alliance. 86
THE ROLE OF LAW IN DEFINING THE RANGE OF ALLIANCES

Strategic alliances have multiplied primarily because of changing market conditions and technology, but these factors do not completely determine the proper
realms of hierarchy (i.e., the firm), alliance, and market transaction-law and
lawyers are also relevant. If, for example, courts do not impose as default rules
81. See generally ROBERT]. RlNGER, WJNNlNG THROUGH lNT!MlDATION (1974).
82. ]. Edwin Dietel, Exceptional Lawyer Leadership: Trust and Iimtworthiness, LAw PRACTICE Q.,june
2002, available at http://www.abanet.orgllpm/newsletter/anicles/newsarticle0502_p3_front.shtml.
83. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3. cmt. .1 (2002) ("A lawyer must also act ... with
zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalf.").
84. See id. R. 1.6(b)(l).
85. See RASMUSEN, supra note 47, at 43 ("The purpose of the legal staff is to deter the other side
from trying to be sly or dishonest .... ").
86. See FREUND, mpra note 46, at 186 (explaining that businesspeople who have "shaken hands
on a deal, and who then try to introduce new terms and conditions suggested by their lawyers, may
find themselves accused of renegotiating the deal"); Bernstein, supra note 80, at 195 (stating that the
price in deals is usually set before the lawyers arrive "and does not usually change continuously as
the lawyers negotiate other contractual provisions").
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the fiduciary duties that maximize the value of alliances, partners must do costly
drafting to re-define their fiduciary duties, endure a sub optimal alliance, or eschew an alliance altogether in favor of a firm or market transaction. 87
Similarly, the greater the lawyers' skills, the more parties can rely on contracts
to achieve their goals. 86 This does not necessarily mean that improved lawyering
will advance alliances and market transactions at the expense of internal firm
ex'-pansion because astute legal planning can improve incentives and diminish
agency costs in firms as well. Because contract negotiations can expand or reduce
the trust that is so important to alliances, the relevant lawyers' skills include
negotiating as well as drafting.
THE LAWYER'S ROLE IN NEGOTIATIONS
ATTENTION TO THE CLIENT'S BUSINESS NEEDS

To improve their transactional practices lawyers must first change their attitudes
toward their clients. "[E]lite law practitioners do not adequately and efficiently
determine the client's objectives for the representation." 69 The problem is especially acute with strategic alliances because, unlike most business deals, the transaction does not end but only begins with the closing and can last for years. Also,
goals are often vaguer in alliances than in other deals; the aim may be no more
specific than the optimal exploitation of each side's research capabilities. Again,
to attain such a goal trust and cooperation are vital. Lawyers accustomed to concrete objectives may not effectively pursue or even understand so amorphous
an enterprise.
There are several reasons for this failure. First, lawyers tend to assume that the
client wants them to bargain aggressively for the maximum feasible share of the
benefits of a deal. This assumption is valid in most situations, including not only
litigation but many business deals, but it is often unwarranted in strategic alliances.90 Second, the bar has a tradition of independence that may seem inconsistent with seeking detailed instructions from the client. Of course, lawyers need
some independence in order to meet ethical mandates, but this duty does not bar
lawyers from asking about the client's objectives.
Third, like a lost driver who refuses to ask directions, many lawyers fear that
seeking instructions makes them look ignorant. This fear may be justified. A word
to the wise is sufficient, but lawyers who are ignorant about business may expose
their ignorance by asking the client foolish questions and mishandling the answers
they get. Foregoing guidance, though, only makes matters worse. Lawyers should
overcome embarrassment about seeking instructions, especially about business

87. See genemlly Dent, supm note 3.
88. See Holmstrom & Roberts, supra note 9, at 82 (suggesting that provisions for "rich information
sharing" benefit alliances because "potential information asymmetries are reduced").
89. Robert Eli Rosen, The Inside Counsel Movement, Professional judgment and Organizational Representation, 64!ND. L.J. 479, 505-06 (1989).
90. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
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goals. 91 "A good agent always spends time with his principal reviewing the likely
bargaining issues in order to understand what's important to the principaL"92 One
lawyer's first rule for outside counsel is "Know Your Client."93 Lawyers' arrangements with clients are themselves relational contracts; "neither lawyers nor clients
can effectively perform without cooperation from each other." 94
As the last statement implies, the need to explain runs both ways. Sophisticated
clients may know when to ask a lawyer to explain a legal principle or contract
term, but clients from some cultures hesitate to ask such questions. 95 Clients who
are new to strategic alliances may not even know what they don't know.
To improve communication with clients the training of business lawyers must
change. Unfortunately, growing pressure to keep fees down forces law firms to
reduce, not expand, apprentice training of new lawyers. Law schools, however,
can do a better job. Most corporate law case books pay little attention to business
goals, which they may erroneously assume are always obvious. The instructor can
raise these issues, but casual inquiries suggest that most rarely do so. Apart from
improving instruction in individual business courses, law schools can also offer
better overall programs in business law. Some schools now have concentrations
in various fields, including business organizations. 96 A well designed program can
make lawyers more sensitive to clients' business needs.
The proliferation of house counsel in recent years 97 is evidence both of the
shortcomings of outside counsel and of the possibility of ameliorating those shortcomings. As full-time employees of their client, in-house lawyers are naturally
attuned to the business needs of the client and in constant contact with its business people to keep abreast of those needs. They have little reason to fear that
they will look foolish by discussing and asking questions about these needs.
Despite the advantages in-house lawyers enjoy, their role tends to be limited to
"routine legal work"; corporations "remain dependent on outside counsel for
specialized advice and representation in critical high-risk areas," like areas where
the law is changing. 98 The very factors that cause firms to undertake projects
through alliances rather than through integration-factors like a need for flexi9 L See Richard W Painter, The Moral Interdependence of Co1porate Lawyers and TI1eir Clients, 67 S.
CALL REv. 507,545 (1994) (stating that in deal-making the line between legal questions and business
questions tends to break down).
92. FREUND, supra note 46, at 178.
93. Marjorie Doyle, Corporate Gients: A Recipe for Successfully Keeping and Working With Them, 10
CoRP. COUNSEL Q. 64, 64 (1994). Her other rules are largely corollaries of the first; e.g., "Keep Good
Communication." ld. at 66.
94. Painter, supra note 91, at 517; see also AmyL Stickel, The.Odd Couple: GCs and Law Firms
Struggle to Find Common Ground, CoRP. LEG. TIMES, july 2002, at 1, 62 ("General counsel need to
communicate to law firms what the business goals are .... ").
95. See Thomas Adcock, Avoiding Culture Gashes, N.Y. LJ, Feb. 26, 2002, at 16 (''Clients from
some cultures ... will feel reluctant to ask for clarification for fear of offending the lawyer or embarrassing himself" (quoting Bryant, infra note 236, at 43)).
96. For instance, my own institution, Case Western Reserve University School of Law, has created
concentrations in several fields, including Business Organizations.
97. See Rosen, supra note 89, at 488.
98. Michael]. Powell, Professional Innovation: Corporate Lawyers and P1ivate Lawmaking, 18 LAw&:
Soc. INQUIRY 423, 450 (1993).
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bility, rapid adaptation, and effective incentive compensation schemes99-also apply to legal services.
Despite their proximity to the client, in-house lawyers are still subject to
second-guessing (or "hindsight bias") if their advice, however wise, results in
problems. Because in-house lawyers have only one client, they may be even more
risk-averse than the more diversified outside counsel. To protect themselves from
second-guessing they may not only bargain too aggressively but may also call in
outside counsel to assume some of the risk. 100
Thus, the decision to "make or. buy" transactional lawyers often depends on
the effectiveness of outside counsel. If outside lawyers do a better job by, inter
alia, communicating better with clients and paying closer attention to their business needs, there will be more demand for their services.
NEGOTIATING TO ENHANCE TRUST AND COOPERATION

Negotiating alliances requires tactics quite different from the norm for lawyers.
As one expert says, "more problems in alliances are due to weak relationships
than to anything else." 101 Aggressive bargaining undermines trust. "Pressing the
other firm to retreat, or making implied threats, lowers people's enthusiasm and
causes them to withhold information and protect their interests." 102 Further,
"[s]ignals of mistrust breed mistrust. "103 "People who distrust the motives of others
tend to have more rigid and narrow expectations and to provoke the very reactions
they fear." 104 Similarly, "if people receive signals that they are not trusted, they are
likely to become less trustworthy" 105
Good business lawyers realize this. "[T]he image of the lawyer as hired gun is
not an accurate characterization of the role of any transactional business lawyer,
at least any good transactional business lawyer .... "106 Instead of battling tooth

99. See supra notes 4-10 and accompanying text.
100. See Edward A. Bernstein, The Benefits of Blaming the Lawyer: How a Law Firm's Compensation
System May Affect !ts Ability to Serve Clients by Assuming the Risk of Being Second-Guessed 8
(unpublished manuscript, on file at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id = 284209).
101. LEWIS, supra note 51, at 20.
102. ld. at 45; see a!so Blair & Stout, supra note 66, at 1776 (stating that aggressive lawyers can
quickly demolish trust slowly built up between the parties over a long time); Bernstein, supra note
80, at 229 (stating that hard bargaining increases "attitudinal costs"); Lisa Bernstein, The Silicon
Va!!ey Lawyer as Transaction Cost Engineer?, 74 OR. L. REV. 239, 249-50 (1995); David Charny,
Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercia! Relationships, 104 HARv. L. REV. 375, 405 (1990) (stating that
adversarial bargaining can "rais[e] the specter of litigation for transactors who wish to view themselves as friends or partners"); Sheppard, supra note 77, at 2.~ ("[Blinding, painful discussions can
create antagonistic relations.").
103. Frankel, supra note 60, at 459.
104. John G. Holmes &John K. Rempel, Trust in Close Relationships, in CLOsE REu.noNSHIPS 187,
190 (Clyde Hendrick ed., 1989). Conversely; "those who are more willing to trust other people are
likely to be equally trustworthy in that they are less likely to lie, cheat, or steal." David Good, Individuals, !nte1persona! Relations, and Trust, in TRUST: MAKING AND BREAKING COOPERATIVE REU\TIONS,
supra note 39, at 32.
105. Frankel&: Gordon, supra note 57, at 322.
106. Bernstein, supra note 102, at 241.
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and nail for unilateral advantage, the parties should seek "mutual satisfaction." 107
This does not mean just splitting the difference on disputed points; with that
approach "creativity suffers. People feel compromised ...." 108 Rather parties can
work to expand the total pie so that both feel like winners. 109
Sometimes a lawyer need not be aggressive to gain a one-sided agreement. If
one partner is smaller, poorer, and has no feasible alternative to the alliance under
consideration, it may have little choice but to accept whatever terms the stronger
side demands. This situation naturally appeals to the stronger party's lawyer, who
not only can get her way without a fight but also speedily close the deal at a cost
the client will like.
Nonetheless, the lawyer should ask the client whether to exploit its advantage.
An alliance needs trust and cooperation; it will not thrive if even one side judges
the deal unfair. People who feel abused often retaliate, even if they know that
retaliation is costly. 110 In a bad contract both sides may withhold their best efforts.
The stronger party should seek fair terms, explain its proposals, and listen to its
partner. People more readily accept a result if they helped create it and understand
the reasons for it. Ill Lawyers should not assume that the other party's silence
reflects agreement but should ask the other if it considers the terms fair.
Not all negotiators so behave. The beneficiary of an unfair term may deride
efforts by the other party's lawyer to address this problem by contract as overlawyering that is eroding trust. A lawyer needs a close relationship with the client
so as to retain its support in the face of such criticism.
While seeking mutual benefit parties need not eschew self-interested bargaining, 112 but advantage should be pursued with prudent restraint. Trust evaporates
if a party refuses to budge on numerous points, so each side should identify its

107. FREUND, supra note 46, at 23-24; see also Ronald J Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Foreword:
Business Lawyers and Value Creation for Clients, 74 OR. L REv. 1, 10-11 (1995) (calling the concern
of each party to maximize its own profit a pitfall in bargaining).
108. LEWIS, supra note 51, at 45.
109. See Neale & Bazerman, supra note 73, at 40 (calling this approach "integrative bargaining");
FREUND, supra note 46, at 21-22.
110. See George Loewenstein, Preferences, Behavior, and Welfare: Emotions in Economic The01y and
Economic Behavior, 90 AM. EcoN. REv. 426, 429-40 (2000); Matthew -Rabin, Incorporating Fairness
into Game Theory and Economics, 83 AM. EcoN. REv. 1281, 1284 (1993). For example, in the ultimatum
game one player is given some money but must offer part of it to a second player, who may accept
the offer or reject it. In the latter case neither gets anything, yet offers of less than twenty percent are
often rejected. See Colin Camerer & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: Ultimatums, Dictators and Manners,
J ECON. PERSP., Spring 1995, at 209, 210; Alvin E. Roth, Bargaining Expe1iments, in THE HANDBOOK
OF EXPERJMENTAL EcoNOMICS 253, 270, 274-75, 282-88, 296-302 Oohn H. Kagel & Alvin E. Roth
eels., 1995); see also Karl Sigmund et aL, The Economics of Fair Play, 286 SCI. AM. 83,83 (2002); Ernst
Fehr & Simon Gachter, Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments, 90 AM. ECON. REv.
980 (2000); Ernst Fehr & Simon Giichter, Altruistic Punishment in Humans, 415 NATURE 137 (2002).
IlL See Joel Brockner & Phyllis Siegel, Understanding the Interaction Between Procedural and Dist1ibutive justice: The Role of Trust, in TRUST IN ORGANIZATIONS: FRONTIERS OF THEORY AND RESEARCH,
supra note 11, at 390, 391; see also id. at 402 ("[P]roceduraljustice positively influences trust.").
112. See FREUND, supra note 46, at 24-25 (cautioning against "cooperative bargaining" stating that
"some familiar maneuvers, some give and take" are part of a "process" that is expected and makes
most people comfortable).
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key issues and limit hard bargaining to them while bending more readily on minor
issues.m Proposing a complex contract may itself undermine the other party's
trust because it indicates that the proponent does not trust the other party: "Businessmen often prefer to rely on 'a man's word' .... "114 "[P]arties propose simple
contracts ... in order to signal that they are trustworthy."m Complex contracts
are also more costly to draft 116 and can restrict flexibility in an alliance that will
need to adapt to unanticipated conditions over a life of several years. m
Simple contracts foreclose attention to detail and drafting to cover as many
issues as possible, practices often considered hallmarks of a good lawyer. 118
Lawyers also specialize in spotting and addressing potential problems of opportunism, but this focus can diminish trust and the willingness of parties to make
concessions.u 9 Business people reject these practices not only because hard bargaining erodes trust but also because they rely on reputation to deter each other
from opportunism. 120
Proposing unusual terms also impairs trust by signaling that the client will "rely
on his legal rights" in case of a dispute rather than trying to resolve it amicably.m
Uncertainty about the meaning and impact of a novel term makes the other party

113. See Karen Eggleston et al., The Design and Interpretation of Contracts: Why Complexity Matters,
95 Nw. U. L. REv. 91, 116 (2000) ("The contract need deal only with states in which the payoffs are
very high, for it is in these states that the threat of retaliation [or other extralegal sanctions] may not
deter a party from engaging in opportunism."); FREUND, supra note 46, at 69-70, 82.
114. Macaulay, supra note 70, at 58; see also Blair & Stout, supra note 66, at 1806 n.206, 1807
n.209 (stating that a detailed contract may undermine trust).
115. Eggleston et al., supra note 113, at 117; see Samuel Bowles, Endogenous Preferences: The Cultural
Consequences of Markets and Other Economic Institutions, 36]. EcoN. LITERATURE 75, 95 (1998) (stating
that cooperation is more likely if parties consider their contract incomplete); Gulati, mpra note 4, at
95 (saying firms eschew tight contracts if they have "familiarity with their partners and judgment that
they were trustworthy"); Macaulay, supra note 70, at 64 (saying that "[s]ome businessmen object that
in ... a carefully worked out relationship one gets performance only to the letter of the contract,"
whereas performing to the spirit of the contract would offer mutual expected gains); see also supra
note 62 and accompanying text.
116. One side pays to draft a detailed contract; the other may pay even more to read and divine
its ramifications. See RAsMVSEN, supra note 47, at 39.
117. See LEWis, supra note 51, at 27 ("Because they are intended to make regular advances, alliances
depend on ongoing change."); Helper et al., supra note 38, at 466. Detailed contracts may require
frequent recourse to the partners' headquarters for interpretations, waivers, or modifications, which
can cause damaging delay. A detailed contract may also restrict the ability of one party to retaliate
against uncooperative behavior by the other. See generally ERNST FEHR ET AL., FAIRNESS, INCENTIVES
AND CONTRACTUAL INCOMPLETENESS (CESifo Working Paper No. 445, 2001).
ll8. See Snider, supra note 4 3, at 57 ("Simply put, clients want 'good enough' legal services, and
outside lawyers frequently strive to deliver work worthy of an A+ on a law school exam.").
ll9. See Neale & Bazerman, supra note 73, at 42-44. This phenomenon stems from most people's
loss aversion, so that "framing" negotiations to focus on potential gains rather than possible losses
facilitates reaching agreement. See id.
120. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
121. Lisa Bernstein, Social Norms and Default Rules Analysis, 3 S. CAL. lNTERDISC. L.j. 59, 70-71
(1993); see also Bernstein, supra note 80, at 230 n.l07 (stating that the biggest factor in eroding trust
"is whether the proposal departs from custom"). "Merely suggesting an agreement other than the one
provided by [the law's default rules] implies anticipation of a breach rather than the total commitment
of true love." Id. at 232.
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even more suspicious. 122 Using standard terms curbs a lawyer's creativity, but it is
safer for the lawyer 113 and may benefit clients.
As well as bad practices to avoid, there are good practices to follow. 114 The
parties should strive not only for the best contract but also to build mutual trust:
'The task at [the] initial stage is not to nail down specifics, but to raise mutual
awareness and become more comfortable." 125 Often firms conclude an alliance
"only after people have built constructive relationships, usually over several
months." 126 "[S]ome of the most resolute positions soften when people know each
other better. "127
This is true for lawyers as well as business people. One veteran says "the attorney on the other side and I see each other as partners facilitating a mutually
beneficial business arrangement." 118 This is done by "signaling of shared assumptions and understandings at the very beginning. Competence, benevolence, and
integrity [are] important antecedents of trustworthiness." 119 jordan Lewis recommends: "avoid the common mistake of exchanging written proposals." 130 And:
"start with views, not positions .... Candor is our style; bluffing and deception
are unacceptable .... We will use only logic, not politics or pressure, to find the
best solutions." 131 Negotiating behavior is so important some firms" 'select people
with less than perfect intellects but with excellent interpersonal skills.' "132 During
negotiations, good lawyers can remind clients that in strategic alliances, contract
terms are not always meant to be kept. 133
Further, with relational contracts, "the context in which [the negotiation] is
embedded" demands greater attention. 134 The extent to which partners do or
should rely on trust and reputation rather than on contract depends on both the
122. See Bernstein, supra note 80, at 248-50 (stating that using standard tenns bolsters trust
because the parties are familiar with them and don't need an effort to understand them or to predict
their effect). Other benefits of standard terms include "avoidance of formulation errors, ease in drafting,
land] availability of judicial rulings on the validity and interpretation of the term." Marcel Kahan &
Michael Klausner, Path Dependence in Cmporate Contracting: Increasing Retums, Herd Behavior and
Cognitive Biases, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 347, 350 (1996).
123. See id. at 354-56 (stating that lawyers prefer standard terms because their results are more
predictable and the lawyers reputation will suffer less if a bad outcome results from a standard term
rather than a novel term).
124. One commentary lists the following: Be cordial and flexible; be an active listener; have stamina;
know when to say no; do not negotiate against yourself; and stop arguing after you win. Thomas E
Villeneuve & Daniel M. Kaufman, Creating Successful Technology-Based Corporate Partnering An·angements, in STRUCTURING, NEGOTIATING & IMPLEMENTING STRATEGIC AlliANCES: 2001, at 59, 72-73 (PLJ
Corporate Law & Practice Course, Handbook Series No. B-1260, 2001).
125. LEWis, supra note 51, at 22.
126. Jd.
127. Id. at 23. People are more inclined to cooperate when they believe that others will cooperate
and that cooperation will benefit all participants. See Robyn M. Dawes, Social Dilemmas, 31 ANN. REv.
PsYCHOL 169, 182-88 (1980) (summarizing results of many studies).
128. LEWIS, supra note 51, at 262 (quoting an unnamed lawyer).
129. Sydow, supra note 65, at 38.
130. LEWIS, supra note 51, at 41.
131. Jd. at 220.
132. Id. at 29 (citation omitted).
133. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
134. Sheppard & Tuchinsky, supra note 11, at 147.
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nature of the partners and on their past dealings. A small, new firm, for example,
may not have much of a reputation and may be unwilling to incur large costs to
develop one. If the parties are strangers to each other and come from different
industries, or countries, or both, neither may have much reason to trust the
other. 135 Each may fear not only the other's opportunism, but also that there may
be sincere disputes about their duties in the alliance. In such cases, a tight contract
can reassure them that they agree on what each must do and that promises will
be kept. 136
A focus on context precludes the usual modus operandi of business lawyersdrafting a contract by simply changing the names on the last deal. Tailoring a
unique contract (without resorting to unusual terms) 137 takes more of a lawyer's
time and, therefore, is more expensive for the client. If lawyer and client communicate closely; though, this should not be a problem. If the transaction does
not warrant a detailed contract-either because the money involved is too small
or because the parties rely heavily on trust-the client can so inform the lawyer.
SUBSTANTIVE TERMS IN STRATEGIC ALLIANCES

The analysis so far has focused on process, and on the behavior of lawyers in
negotiating strategic alliances. Most of the discussion has concerned detrimental
practices to avoid, but lawyers can also add value with the substantive terms
they draft.
WHETHER TO ENTER AN ALLIANCE

Whether to "make or buy" an input or to obtain it through an alliance is a
business question, but lawyers can help answer it by explaining the legal problems
and benefits of each option. For example, inability to monitor, evaluate, and
control the partner's performance is often a problem in alliances, 138 but this is also
a problem with employees if the firm "makes" the input. Indeed, it may be easier
to end an unsatisfactory alliance than to fire unsatisfactory employees. 139 It is also
easier to design disincentives to termination for a partner than for an employee
because little can be recovered from an employee who quits. 140
135. See Gulati, supra note 4, at 95 ("[F]irms trust domestic partners more than international
partners, not only because more and better information is available about domestic firms, but also
because the reputational consequences of opportunistic behavior are greater in a domestic context.").
136. See Sim B. Sitkin & Darryl Stickel, The Road to Hell: The Dynamics of Distrust in an Era of
Quality, in TRUST IN ORGANIZATIONS: fRONTIERS OF THEORY AND RESEARCH, supra note 11, at 196, 198
(stating that legalistic mechanisms (like detailed contracts) are useful in fostering trust where it does
not already exist).
137. See supra notes 122-23 and accompanying text.
138. See Oxley, supra note 6, at 389 (discussing the in£\uence on alliance structure of "appropriability hazards," which she defines as comprising problems of drafting, monitoring the partner, and
enforcing the contract).
139. Firing employees may, for instance, trigger problems under ami-discrimination and unemployment benefit laws.
140. See CAUMARI & PERILLO, supra note 48, at 570 (describing "a strong policy against" awarding
consequential damages against employees).
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CHOICE OF ENTITY: INTRODUCTION

Often, a key decision for the lawyers is whether to create a separate entity for
the alliance and, if so, what form to give it; alliances choosing the wrong structure are less profitable than those choosing the right structure. 141 The choice
depends on both legal issues (like taxes and limited liability) and transaction
cost economics. 142
Many alliances are called 'joint ventures," but this term is ambiguous. In law,
a true joint venture is basically treated as a general partnership except it usually
implies a single, limited enterprise rather than a broad collaboration of indefinite
duration. 143 Many so-called "joint ventures" are incorporated, however, in which
case the entity is legally a corporation and is often called a 'joint venture
corporation." 144
The legal status of other alliances may be unclear. "The receipt by a person of a
share of the profits of a business is prima facie evidence that he is a partner in the
business .... "145 In a franchise, dealership, distributorship, or licensing agreement,
each party pursues profit, but these arrangements are not usually partnerships because profits are earned separately, not shared from a single pooL The line, however,
marking the boundary of profit-sharing that defines a partnership is hazy. 146
The legal status of an alliance may be important in several ways. For example,
partners are agents of the partnership with authority to bind it when acting in the
ordinary course of its business. 147 Partners are also liable for the debts of the
partnership. 148 Neither of these rules applies to either the shareholders of corporations149 or to parties to a sales contract.

I4I. See Rachelle C Sampson, The Cost of Inappropriate Govemance in R&D Alliances, at i (unpublished manuscript, on file at http://www.law.columbia.edu!law-economicstudies/workshops/
RSampsonOI.pdD (finding that "alliance governance selected according to transaction cost arguments
improves collaborative benefits substantially over governance not so selected").
I42. See generally Oxley, supra note 6.
I43. Both the Uniform Partnership Act section 6(I) and Revised Uniform Partnership Act section
101(6) define "partnership" as "an association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a
business for profit." UNJF. P'SHIP ACT§ 6(1) (l9I4), 6 U.LA. 393 (200I); UNIF. P'SHIP ACT§ I01(6)
(1997), 6 U.LA. 6I (2001). "[T]he joint venture, if distinguished from a partnership at all, must
be categorized as a business association similar to the partnership but more narrow in purpose and
scope." REusCHLEIN &: GREGORY, supra note 24, at 45I; see also I HARROCH, supra note 26, at 2-73.
144. See I id. § 2.09(2), at 2-75.
I45. UNIF. P'SHIP ACT§ 7(4) (l9I4), 6 U.LA. 418 (2001); see also UNIF. P'SHIP ACT§ 202(c)(3)
(1997), 6 U.LA. 93 (2001).
I46. See WtLL!AM A. GREGORY, THE L\W OF AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP§§ I75, I78 (3d ed. 2001)
(discussing complexities of profit-sharing as an element of definition of "partnership").
147. UNIF. P'SHIP ACT§ 9(I) (1914), 6 U.LA. 553 (200I); UNIF. P'SHIP ACT§ 30I(l) (1997), 6
U.LA. IOI (200I); see also I HARROCH, supra note 26, at 2-74 (saying that "each joint venturer has
the power and ability to bind the other joint venturer and to subject it to liability to third persons in
matters which are within the scope of the enterprise").
I48. See UNIF. P'sHIPACT § I5 (I9I4), 6 U.LA. 613 (2001); see also UNtF. P'SHIPACT § 306 (1997),
6 U.LA. ll7 (200I).
149. See GEVURTZ, supra note 22, § 1.1, at 2 (calling limited shareholder liability the "most significant" feature of the corporate form).
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The choice of entity also influences the scope of the allies' fiduciary duties.
Members of a partnership owe each other high fiduciary duties. 150 The scope of
fiduciary duties in a non-public corporation is uncertain. Some states impose the
same fiduciary duties for them as for partnerships, at least when the shareholders
are individuals; others do not. 151
Fiduciary duties may determine, for example, whether one party to an alliance
must share a business opportunity with the other or can dissolve the alliance and
force a sale of its assets. To some extent, fiduciary duties may be modified by
agreement, but modifications require costly drafting and the permissible scope of
modifications is not unlimited. If both parties to an alliance want it limited in
scope, have other alliances, and are wealthy enough not to fear an opportunistic
dissolution by the other, they may prefer to owe each other low fiduciary duties.
Often, however, these conditions do not hold for at least one party, which may
prefer high fiduciary duties.
A clear statement of the scope of the alliance can define what opportunities
parties may take only through the alliance and which they may pursue alone or
with third parties. 152 But specific terms can never cover all contingencies and
fiduciary duties are invoked to answer questions not resolved by the contract.
One party may come to feel that these fiduciary duties are so broad that its
freedom to act outside the alliance is unduly restricted, or so narrow that it is not
being treated fairly by its partner. The disgruntled partner then may either shirk
in its performance or seek to terrninate the alliance. Thus, lawyers need to set the
right level of fiduciary duties, and choice of the forrn of entity is an important
step in so doing.
Alliances can be classified on a continuum at one end of which are 50-50 joint
ventures where control and profits are shared equally. 153 ln the middle are alliances
that have majority and minority partners. Both kinds are called "equity alliances."154 At the other end is the bilateral sales or service contract, in which duties

150. See GREGORY, sttpra note 146, § 188, at 298 ("The standard by which fiduciary duty is measured is historically a high standard .... ").
151. Compare Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New Eng., 328 N.E.2d 505, 515 (Mass. 1975)
(holding that "stockholders in the close corporation owe one another substantially the same fiduciary
duty in the operation of the enterprise that partners owe to one another") (footnotes omitted), with
Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1379-81 (Del. 1993) (declaring "no special rules for a 'closelyheld corporation'").
152. See Universal Studios Inc. v. Viacom Inc., 705 A.2d 579, 594-95 (Del. Ch. 1997) (holding
joint venturers subject to fiduciary duty of loyalty but limiting it to terms of their non-competition
clause); see also Ernst & Glover, supra note 44, at 11 (advising "giving the venture a sufficiently broad
scope" and "restrict[ing] the partners' right to engage in activities within that scope," but also that
"[p]artners should should establish exclusive arrangements only when necessary").
153. "The essential characteristic of a joint-venture is that unlike a hierarchy; there is no ultimate
'unity of command' and property rights and control are shared by the parent firms." Balakrishnan &
Koza, supra note 31, at 101.
154. They are also sometimes called "hierarchies" because "equity joint ventures hav[e] governance
attributes closest to those of internal organizations." Oxley, supra note 6, at 389. In corporate finance
literature the internal organization (i.e., a firm) is often called a hierarchy. See WILUAMSON, supra note 4.
Calling joint ventures "hierarchies" is misleading, though. See sttpra note 153.

Lawyers and Tntst in Business Alliances

69

and rights (including profit shares) are spelled out by contract, or control is vested
in one party. 155
Equity alliances are used when drafting and enforcing a sales or service contract
could face three difficulties. 156 The first is "appropriability hazards" stemming from
"weak property rights." 157 "A partner may either free-ride by limiting its contnbutions to an alliance" 158 or may appropriate know-how belonging to the other
party or developed by the two parties jointly. This hazard is greatest when shirking
or appropriation by a party is hard for the other to detect. The second is asymmetric information; that is, uncertainty about a partners ability to help develop a
new product or about the value of information held by the partner which cannot
be fully revealed without undue risk that the first party can then appropriate the
information. 159
The third difficulty is specifying duties when parties must coordinate their
efforts; that is, "the anticipated organizational complexity of decomposing tasks
among partners along with the ongoing coordination of activities to be completed
jointly or individually across organizational boundaries and the related extent of
communication and decisions that would be necessary," raising "an ongoing need
for mutual adaptation and adjustment." 160 These difficulties are common when
parties want to develop new technology together. 161 Specifying duties, for example, is complicated because the parties do not know how the project will evolve
or what it will produce.
Equity sharing in alliances is often equated with a tight governance structure,
but the two do not always go together. For example, "[r]epeated ties [between
two parties] diminish use of hierarchical controls," 162 though not use of equity
sharing. Also, "[w]hen there is trust, firms no longer consider hierarchical controls
to be necessary." 163 It is unsurprising that these two factors have a similar effect
because repeated ties enhance trust.
Governance features include "formal and informal monitoring or reporting requirements, provisions for third-party arbitration, details of assignments of managerial control rights, and the extent of effective hostage exchanges built into the

155. See Balakrishnan&: Koza, supra note 31, at 100-01 (comparing joint ventures with "market
mediated contracts").
156. See Oxley, supra note 6, at 388 (stating that '"hierarchical' alliances will be chosen for transactions where contacting hazards are more severe"); Sampson, supra note 141, at 3 (stating that joint
ventures are more likely to be used "[a]s contracting difficulties rise"); see also supra notes 4-ll and
accompanying text.
157. Oxley, supra note 6, at 388. She lists these "hazards" as: "adequately specifying payoff-relevant
activities, monitoring the execution of prescribed activities, and/or enforcing contracts through the
courts." Id. at 389.
158. Gulati, supra note 29, at 300.
159. See Balakrishnan&: Koza, supra note 31, at 100.
160. Ranjay Gulati &: Harbir Singh, The Architecture of Cooperation: Managing Coordination Costs
and Appropriation Concerns in Strategic Alliances, 43 ADMIN. Set Q. 781, 782 (1998); see also Oxley,
supra note 6, at 390 (referring to "the need for continued cooperation within the joint venture").
161. See Gulati &: Singh, supra note 160, at 789-90, 804.
162. Id. at 807.
163. Id. at 790.
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agreement." 164 Several factors predict levels of hierarchy in an alliance, but there
is no fixed pattern of governance features on a continuum from less to more
hierarchy: "there is ... considerable variation in the formal structures of alliances
. . • . " 155 Some variety may stem from economic change, like the growing importance of technology in alliances, but as experience teaches what terms work best,
this variety may diminish. Much of the variety, though, grows out of underlying
differences among alliances.
INCENTIVE STRUCTURES

Again, strategic alliances feature different levels of trust, and even the highest
level-norm-based trust-does not always induce optimal cooperation; even a
normally virtuous partner may defect if the prospective rewards are high
enough. 155 Also, willingness to cooperate beyond the dictates of self-interest depends on a belief that the benefits of the alliance are shared fairly 157 Accordingly,
partners need incentive structures that seem fair to both sides and that maximize
the value of the alliance. Incentive structures depend in part on the form of entity
In a joint venture partners share profits from one project. In a strategic investment
(or "equity link") the investor has an interest in all the investees profits. 158 In a
franchise, license, distributorship, or dealership, both parties hope to benefit, but
they do not in the usual sense share profits.
Even after the form of entity is chosen, many decisions about incentives remain.
In strategic investments, for example, the parties must decide not only what share
of the investee's equity the investor will receive but also fix the investor's other
financial rights. If the investee's fortunes fall, the investor may want it to dissolve
and liquidate so as to recoup what remains of the investment. The investees
managers may want to continue the business, though, because they are playing
with the investors money. One way out of this dilemma is to give the investor a
security with a liquidation preference so that losses are suffered first by the managers (who hold junior securities) and any salvage value in the firm goes first to
the investor. 159
Similarly, parties to an alliance often realize benefits at different times. A party
who has already reaped its benefits may lose its commitment to its partner. 17° For
164. Oxley, supra note 6, at 391.
165. Gulati, Sllpra note 2.9, at 302.; see also Gulati & Singh, supra note 160, at 791-92. (levels of
hierarchical controls vary among joint ventures).
166. See Eggleston eta!., supra note 113, at 116.
167. See infra text accompanying note 177.
168. See Thomas Hellmann, A Theory of Strategic Investing, 64]. FIN. EcoN. 2.85, 287 (2002.) ("[Ajn
independent venture capitalist only pursues financial objectives, while the strategic investor also cares
about the new venture's strategic impact."). The investor's objectives often include "influence or control
over the Company and its business plans. In addition, the investment may serve as a prelude to an
ultimate acquisition of the Company by the Corporate Investor." Mark A. Medearis & Michael W
Hall, Minority Equity Investments in Connection With Strategic Alliances, in STRUCTURING, NEGOTIATING
& IMPLEMENTING STRATEGIC ALLIANCES: 2001, supra note 124, at 93.
169. See GEVURTZ, supra note 22, § 2..1.1, at 119-20 (discussing uses of liquidation preferences).
170. See Khanna et al., supra note 54, at 198.
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instance, a distributor may incur large costs cultivating a market for a manufacturer's product and expect to recover these costs from its share of future sales of
the product. After these costs are incurred, though, the manufacturer may be
tempted to switch to a new distributor who has no such costs to recoup and may,
therefore, be willing to take a lower cut from sales. 171
The alliance contract must deter such opportunism not only to avoid unfairness
to the distributor, but also to help ensure the manufacturer that the distributor
will not shrink from incurring the optimal expense to develop the market. One
solution is to provide for simultaneous performance or to segment performance
into small increments. 172 For example, if one party provides all or most of the
capital, financing may be "staged"-that is, conditions must be satisfied before
each contribution must be made. 173 The conditions must be carefully drafted so
that the financing party cannot withhold a contribution in order to force an opportunistic dissolution and the other party cannot demand further contributions
to a venture that seems unlikely to be profitable.
It may be wise for the party making the bigger contribution to receive hostages
from its partner. The ideal hostage is something that is not so valuable to the
recipient as to tempt it to breach the agreement and keep the hostage, but is so
valuable to the giver that it declines to breach lest it lose the hostage. 174 Hostages
can be monetary, including performance bonds and escrow accounts. Because the
recipient cannot automatically and costlessly seize these monies, their benefit to
the recipient is less than their cost to the giver. Thus these devices serve the
purpose of encouraging the giver to perform without inviting the recipient to
seize the hostage opportunistically.
Also important are termination provisions that adequately credit the inputs of
each party. 175 Like a liquidation preference, this ensures that the partner who
contributes more will get more back on dissolution.
Fairness does not always require equal sharing of benefits. For example, one
franchise of a supplier may fail while another franchise prospers under an identical
agreement. Franchisees' fortunes may differ because one has a better territory or
simply because it is more efficient. 176 Parties should try to maximize the total
benefits of the alliance and agree "early on ... that fairness in outcomes is needed
171. See Seminar, UcensingAgreements: How To Draft and Enforce Them 3 Ouly 18, 2001) [hereinafter Licensing Seminar], available at http://www.law.com/cgi-bin!gx.cgi!ApplLog.
172. See Royce de R. Barondes, The Business Lawyer as Terrorist Transaction Cost Engineer, 69 FoRDHAM L. REv. 31, 39-40 (2000).
173. Staged financing is common in venture capital financings. See George W Dent, Jr., Venture
Capital and the Future of Corporate Finance, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 1029, 1043-44 (1992).
174. See Oliver E. Williamson, Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange, 73 AM.
EcoN. REv. 519, 522-26 (1983); see also Bryan Borys&: David B. jemison, Hyb1id Arrangements as
Strategic Alliances: Theoretical Issues in Organizational Combinations, 14 ACAD. MGMT. REv. 234,
243 (1989).
175. See infra text accompanying notes 212-26.
176. Franchise contracts give much of the alliance profits to the franchisee who, therefore, has
strong incentives to succeed. See ]ames A. Brickley &: Frederick H. Dark, The Choice of Organizational
Form: The Case of Franchising, 18]. FIN. EcoN. 401, 404-05 (1987); Holmstrom&: Roberts, supra
note 9, at 87-88.
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to ensure each firm's commitment .... One principle ... is to share gains in
proportion to the value of your contributions." 177 As this suggests, incentives
should be tailored to the circumstances of each alliance. 178
REQUIRED PERFORMANCES AND THE SCOPE OF THE ALLIANCE

In defining duties in an alliance, a drafter must navigate between the Scylla of
too little detail and the Charybdis of too much. Excessive detail may impose
unrealistic burdens on a party and commit the venture to an unpromising path. 179
On the other hand, disappointment and disputes can occur when, for example,
the know-how to be transferred to the alliance by one party is not adequately
specified, and the know-how actually transferred proves to be less than the other
party wanted and expected. 180
The scope of the alliance triggers more disputes than any other issue. 181 Too
broad a scope may stop a partner from pursuing profitable opportunities alone
or with third parties. It also increases the risk of appropriation of technical knowledge.182 Too narrow a scope invites a party to usurp benefits that should be shared
with the partner. The threat of such seizures can cripple an alliance by discouraging parties from sharing information or exerting their best efforts for the alliance.
Several facts may complicate the drafting of a definition of the venture's scope.
In research and development deals, "adequate specification of property rights will
inevitably be problematic, since the contracted assets do not exist at the time the
contract is written, and technological innovation is a highly uncertain process. "183
The proper scope depends not only on the nature of the venture but also on the
characteristics of the partners: "The opportunity set of each firm outside the particular alliance crucially affects its behavior within the alliance." 184
As this suggests, the ideal scope of an alliance may change over time. Research
and development take unexpected directions, as do product markets and competition. The partners' outside activities may change. Their growing knowledge
of each other also matters; as noted, alliances often begin small and hope that in
177. LEWIS, supra note 51, at 23.
178. Thus, for example, franchise contracts for gasoline sales differ from those for repair services
at automobile service stations. See Holmstrom & Roberts, supra note 9, at 87-89.
179. See Doz, supra note 38, at 67 (stating that one hindrance to cooperation in alliances was "a
definition of the tasks to be performed, which did not do justice to their true complexity"); id. at 76
(decrying contracts that are "overly deterministic").
180. See Oxley, supra note 6, at 393-94 (discussing difficulties in adequately specifying the knowhow and rights to be transferred in an alliance).
181. See Stephen L Glover, Negotiating and Structuring joint Ventures: Lessons from Management Consultants, M&A LAw., Mar. 1998, at l, 7 ("most high profile joint venture litigation turns on issues of
scope"); see also Ernst & Glover, supra note 44, at 10-ll (discussing dangers from defining scope
either too narrowly or too broadly).
182. See joanne E. Oxley & Rachelle C. Sampson, The Scope and Governance of International R&D
Alliances 4 Quly l, 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file at http:/lpages.stem.nyu.edulrsampson!
scope 7-02. pdO ("The more extensive, complex, uncertain, and interdependent are the activities performed in an alliance, the greater is the potential risk of opportunism.").
183. Oxley, supra note 6, at 394 (citation omitted).
184. Khanna et al., supra note 54, at 205 (emphasis omitted).
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time mutual trust will grow and justify expanding the alliance. 185 The drafter,
then, must both define the initial scope of the venture and also provide good
ways to revise that definition.
GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS

As noted, the utility of strategic alliances stems from the problems of both
hierarchy (i.e., control over employees for things a firm "makes") and contract
(i.e., agreements by a firm to "buy" inputs in market transactions). 186 While alliances, however, have proliferated recently, they still comprise a fairly small percentage of business activity. Further, most alliances terminate before reaching their
goals 187 Clearly an alliance is not always preferable to making or buying inputs
and, where an alliance is best, proper governance arrangements are crucial.
"50-50 alliances have a substantially higher success rate than joint ventures
with uneven ownership .... "188 Fifty-fifty ventures require mechanisms to break
deadlocks, though. 189 Moreover, one partner may reasonably demand more control if it is making a substantially larger contribution. In that case, mechanisms
are needed to protect the minority partner against oppression. For example, the
junior may have a right to terminate the deal on terms that make termination
undesirable for the senior. Further, the controlling partner is subject to a heightened fiduciary duty, 190 but that duty may be limited by agreement. 191
In some research and development alliances one party does most of the research
while the other (usually the larger firm and a potential user of the product to be
developed) provides financing. Instead of or in addition to such an arrangement,
one company may make a strategic investment by purchasing stock of another
firm that is developing technology of interest to the investor. Both these arrangements bear some resemblance to venture capital financings, so it is not surprising
that firms providing funds borrow many control mechanisms used in venture
capital deals. 192
DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND

A VOIDANCE

Disputes between partners are inevitable and can shrink an alliance's profits or
tum them to losses, but fear of such damage does not always induce all parties
185. See supra notes 38--39 and accompanying text.
186. See supra notes 4-10 and accompanying text.
187. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
188. Ernst & Glover, supra note 44, at 7. "[T]he success rate is 60 percent for 50-50 deals, and 31
percent for ventures in which one parent has a majority stake." Id.
189. See infra text accompanying notes 194-211.
190. See SICPA Holding S.A. v. Optical Coating Lab., Inc., No. 15129, 1997 WL 10263, at *4
(Del. Ch. jan. 6, 1997).
191. See Terence Woolf, The Venture Capitalist's Corporate Opportunity Problem, 2001 (OLUM. Bus.
L. REV. 4 73, 496-507 (discussing contractual waiver or modification of fiduciary duties); see also supra
note 152.
192. See Lerner & Merges, supra note 17, at 145; Medearis & Hall, supra note 168, at 94 ("While
the venture capital paradigm addresses a number of key elements [in a strategic alliance], it typically
must be customized to address the concerns and motivations of each party.").
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to bargain reasonably: Sometimes people are simply unreasonable and reject measures that would benefit them. More importantly, protracted strife may weigh
unequally on two partners. One side may deliberately precipitate conflict on some
false pretext in order to force termination so it can grab the alliance's assets at
a bargain. 193
Parties at odds can go to court, but litigation generally is slow and expensive,
and generates conflict rather than harmony so that a suit between partners rarely
ends with restoration of a happy, prosperous alliance. Moreover, judges may misunderstand a business dispute and resolve it poorly Accordingly, it is usually wise
for an alliance to have some mechanism to resolve disputes.
One solution is mandatory good-faith bargaining before some action (like filing
a lawsuit or terminating the alliance) can be taken. Mandatory negotiations do
not assure agreement, especially if one side decides to be obstreperous, but a duty
at least to pretend to bargain in good faith may deter opportunism or facilitate a
compromise that would not otherwise occur. 194 When an alliance is incorporated,
the board may have neutral directors, who can resolve disputes or encourage the
parties to behave reasonably so as to settle disputes themselves. 195
Many alliances (and other relational contracts) require arbitration of disputes. 196
The uses of arbitration, however, are finite. To compare matrimony again, no
marriage benefits if one spouse calls a marriage counselor whenever the couple
disagrees about what movie to see or what to eat for dinner. Arbitration clauses
can cause parties to "exaggerate their claims and resist making concessions in
order to offset their perceptions of arbitrator strategy-that arbitrators commonly
'split the difference' between the final positions of the two parties." 197
Arbitration can be helpful, though. Arbitrators sometimes try to restore cooperation.198 They may also understand better than judges the parties' business
goals. 199 "In addition, the parties may tailor the procedural rules in future arbi-

193. The default rules may legitimate this strategy See SLLpra note 21.
194. See RA.sMUSEN, supra note 47, at 43 (saying that mandatory bargaining "can raise welfare by
overcoming pessimistic out-of-equilibrium beliefs"); Thomas]. Stipanowich, Contract and Conflict Management, 2001 WIS. L. REv. 831, 847-51 (2001) (seeing benefits in clauses requiring parties tonegotiate requests for contract revisions).
195. The very presence of neutral directors promotes moderation, especially if parties value their
reputations. Neutral directors also act as mediators, urging conduct to facilitate settlement. One possible problem is that a supposedly neutral director may be influenced to side repeatedly with one
party, as happened in Lehnnan v. Cohen, 222 A.2d BOO (Del. 1966). Accordingly, it may be wise to
require unanimous approval of the neutral director each year, although that could lead to the very
deadlock that a neutral director is supposed to prevent if the parties cannot agree on choice of a
neutral director.
196. See Bernstein, supra note 102, at 241 (stating that alternative dispute resolution arrangements
are favored by many parties, including many large corporations).
197. Neale&: Bazerman, supra note 73, at 37 (citation omitted).
198. See Bernstein, supra note 30, at 1785. In general, arbitration increases social welfare. Id. at
1788 n.237.
199. See TRIANTIS, supra note 47, at 7 ("[F)actors that are nonverifiable before a judicial court may
be verifiable to a specialized arbiter. Vague terms such as 'reasonable' may have a more precise meaning
to an arbiter than a judge and can therefore police a larger range of conduct.").
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trations" in ways not permitted for judicial proceedings. 200 A partner who incessantly demands arbitration, though, would probably cause even more trouble if
arbitration were not available.
lawyers are well acquainted with dispute resolution devices; they know much
less about dispute avoidance techniques. This may be appropriate. As noted before, "legalizing" a relationship can impair needed trust and cooperation. 201 Sometimes, though, contract terms can enhance cooperation and reduce friction. The
analogy of business alliances to marriage is imperfect because alliances are formed
without the parties being in love or even knowing each other well. Alliances often
begin as hesitant trials with hopes that initial success will warrant a deeper and
broader deallater. 202 When allies are still unsure of each other, contract devices
may nourish trust and cooperation.
What are these devices? Lawyers prize precision and enforceability in contracts, 203 but terms that are vague and only aspirational may suit strategic alliances.
Some experts recommend terms declaring the "centrality of trust in the relationship" and "that success will depend on continuing cooperation, which cannot be
fully specified." 204 Though unenforceable, such terms may sway a court or arbitrator to construe broadly the parties' fiduciary and good faith duties. 205 Further,
such terms may influence the parties' norms because most people want to keep
their promises. They remind those who negotiated the deal and inform later arrivals of the attitudes the parties agreed to strive for. 206
Contracts can also foster communication that improves cooperation. "Frequent,
repeated and multifaceted contacts among organizations and an open exchange
of information increase the possibility of trust building .... "207 Some contracts
provide for periodic meetings between the allies and stipulate attendance by senior
managers so as to establish, at high levels, a commitment that will filter down to
200. Id. For example, parties with valuable knowledge can keep arbitration private and confidential
to an extent that is difficult or impossible to achieve in litigation.
201. See supra text accompanying notes 48-53.
202. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
203. See TRIANTIS, supra note 4 7, at 5 ("Contracting parties will not condition their legal obligations
on nonverifiable factors because of the enforcement obstacles raised by the difficulty in verifying the
state to a court."); Alan Schwartz, Relational Contracts in the Courts: An Analysis of Incomplete Agreements
and judicial Strategies, 21]. LEGAL STUD. 271 (1992).
204. LEWIS, supra note 51, at 265.
205. Thus such terms may resemble the ubiquitous "whereas" clause which is not itself enforceable
but which may influence judicial interpretation of the contract. See]OHN EDWARD MURRAY,]R., MURRAY
ON CONTRACTS§ 88B, at 422 (3d ed. 1990) ("These clauses are viewed as persuasive but not controlling
in determining the intention or purpose of the parties.") (footnote omitted).
206. See TRIANTIS, supra note 47, at 10 ("The parties may use a vague term to communicate
intentions and expectations to each other or even to their own co-workers or agents .... ").
207. Sydow, supra note 65, at 48; see also Good, supra note 104, at 36 ("[T]he greater the amount
of communication there is between the players in a wide variety of games, the greater the likelihood
of there being a mutually beneficial outcome."); Gulati, supra note 29, at 306 (one factor that correlates
with success in alliances is "regular information exchange with the partners"); Cynthia Hardy et a!.,
Distinguishing Tnl5t and Power in Interorganizational Relations: Fonns and Farades of Iimt, in TRUST
WITHIN AND BETWEEN ORGANIZATIONS: CONCEPTUAL ISSUES AND EMPIRICAL APPLICATIONS, supra note
35, at 64, 71 (advising partners to "strive for a communicative ethic"); Lorenz, supra note 39, at 207
(members of business networks invariably "stressed the need for personal contact" as well as faithful
contract performance).
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lower employees. Provision can also be made to require discussion whenever
either party requests it. 208
If one party has valuable knowledge, though, the other must be prevented from
seizing that information for its own benefit. Confidentiality agreements may help
inhibit this occurrence. 209 Monitoring can enhance trust by relieving fears that a
partner is cheating.2lD Monitoring can also erode trust, though, by creating fears
that a partner is spying, trying to seize sensitive information that it can use opportunistically.m Such information can include not only technical know-how, but
also information about the partner. For example, a party that learns that its partner
has financial troubles could exploit that knowledge to force a one-sided termination or revision of the agreement.
If partners are deeply divided, though, no contract term can restore cooperation. Termination is then necessary.
TERMINATION

Ironically, the most important provisions in most alliance agreements are those
governing termination.m This is so for four reasons. First, at termination the
stakes are often huge. If one partner can grab most of the alliance's benefits cheap,
the other may suffer a big loss in a venture that could and should have been
profitable for both. Second, the possibility of an opportunistic termination can
undermine a collaboration that could profit both parties. 213 A research firm, for
example, will not exert its best efforts for an alliance if it fears that its partner can
seize the fruits of its research at a bargain price.
Third, the default rules for termination are totally unacceptable for many alliances. For instance, in partnerships (including true joint ventures) any partner
can dissolve at any time and force an auction of the firm's assets unless otherwise
agreed. Finally, termination is almost inevitable and usually occurs when the parties are not feeling generous. A major motive for cooperation in alliances is each
partys hope for the venture's success. When termination looms, that motive is
gone. Moreover, although alliances sometimes end happily when all goals are met
or one partner acquires the other, termination over disputes or dissatisfaction is
more common. The parties then may not voluntarily be fair and reasonable; sound
contract terms are needed. 214
208. This resembles a requirement for mandatory bargaining. See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
209. See LEWIS, supra note 51, at 12 (referring to use of confidentiality agreements).
210. See Helper et aL, supra note 38, at 443, 472 (claiming that monitoring raises trust by limiting
opportunism); see also Good, supra note 104, at 37, 45.
211. "Too close and all encompassing an interface may also block learning." Doz. supra note 38,
at 75. Parties may feel "threatened by the need to make early commitments .... " !d. at 75-76.
212. See HARRIGAN, supra note 23, at 365 (stating that lawyers consider termination clauses "very
important" and devote eighty percent of joint venture agreements to them). More joint ventures have
no exit mechanism, though. See Glover, supra note 181, at 8.
213. See LEWIS, supra note 51, at 48 (trust won't help "when one of you is heading for the exit").
214. See supra note 21 (concerning dissolution and liquidation). Further, before distribution of any
surplus, the capital accounts must be repaid. UNIF. P'SHIP ACT§ 18(a) (1914), 6 U.LA. 101 (2001);
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Exclusive agency and distributorship arrangements are also generally terminable at will. 215 To have a successful alliance, parties "must be able to punish
partners for acts of opportunism and gaming." 216
Termination is an issue on which lawyers can claim and prove their value in
creating alliances. Business people expecting a prosperous venture often think
little about termination before a lawyer arrives, yet they can hardly deny its
importance. 217
Most alliances end with a buyout. 218 A buyout can be arranged without prior
agreement, but it is likely to be more satisfactory if arranged in advance. If both
parties are well financed they may agree to a Russian roulette buyout. 219 If one
partner is not well financed it may be better to provide for a buyout by the
wealthier party at a price fixed by appraisal or a predetermined formula. Because
parties may make their contributions to the alliance at different times, one party
may be tempted to terminate at a time when it has made less of its contribution
than the other party has. Accordingly, termination provisions should take account
of the contributions. 220
Instead of or in addition to a buyout the parties may provide for transfer of
some or all alliance assets to the parties. If, for example, one party contributes
some intellectual property (like a license or patent), the agreement may provide
for that property to be returned to the contributor on termination. 221
Because termination clauses are intended to promote stability and deter opportunism, provisions may vary depending on which party terminates and when.
In a Russian roulette buyout, for instance, the party that terminates must give the
other party the choice to buy out or sell out. 222 Uncertainty of what the other
party will do may discourage terminations. Although courts will not enforce a
penalty, 223 they do uphold provisions for grossly disproportionate divisions of
firm value 224
UNIF. P'SHIP ACT§ 40l(b) (1997), 6 U.L.A. 133 (2001). If partners are not careful at the outset in
setting up their capital accounts, there may be litigation and unfair results in the valuation of contributions of services or of property other than cash. See Dent, supra note 3, at 99-100.
215. See E. ALLAN fARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS§ 7.17, at 556 (2d ed. 1990).
216. Russell johnston&: Paul R. Lawrence, Beyond Vertical Integration-The Rise of the Value-Adding
Partnership, HARV. Bus. REv., july-Aug. 1988, at 94, 101.
217. See LEWIS, supra note 51, at 48 (good termination clauses are crucial even though "discussing
termination when you are trying to develop faith in each other could invite hard feelings"); see also
Ernst&: Glover, supra note 44, at l3 ("suggesting exit provisions ... seems like an act of bad faith").
218. See Ernst&: Glover, supra note 44, at 12 (in one study seventy-five percent of joint ventures
ended with a buyout).
219. See id. at 98-99 (describing this device).
220. This principle is reflected in partnership law, which provides for return of capital contributions
before division of any surplus. See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
221. See Medearis&: Hall, supra note 168, at 106 (describing "rubber band" clause providing, for
example, for return to a party of technology that it has contributed to the alliance).
222. See supra note 219 _
223. See CALAMARJ &: PERILLO, supra note 48, at 589-90 ("[C]ourts have assiduously continued to
refuse enforcement of penalty clauses .... ").
224. See GEVURTZ, supra note 22, § 5.3.1, at 523 ("[C]ourts usually have upheld first options [to
purchase a shareholder's stock] despite arguments that the price was so much less than the value of
the shares as to render the restriction unreasonable.").
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Such provisions may be undesirable, though. A partner may want termination
because it sincerely feels the alliance is unfair or unprofitable or because it wants
to accept a third-party bid to buy the assets of the alliance. In sum, la-wyers must
take care that termination is neither so easy as to invite opportunism nor so
difficult as to lock a party into a bad arrangement.
Another deterrent to opportunistic dissolution is a lengthy notice requirement,
sometimes called an "evergreen" clause. 225 Inter alia, the notice period allows the
weaker party to seek financing (which may come from a new partner) for a bid
if the assets of the alliance are to be auctioned or if there is a Russian roulette
buyout provision. Lengthy notice requirements are not always desirable, though.
For example, some experts recommend provisions allowing prompt termination
by a licensor. 226
IMPLICATIONS FOR LEGAL TRAINING

Law schools have long had a bias toward litigation at the expense of planning
and negotiation. This bias stems from several sources: the continuing dominance
(especially in the first-year curriculum) of the case method, which studies law
through judicial decisions in litigated cases; the overrepresentation on law faculties of specialists in litigation-oriented fields (like torts, constitutional and criminal law, and procedure) as compared with specialists in fields like business, tax
and commercial law and estate planning that invite more attention to planning
and negotiation; and the interest of most scholars (including those in the latter
fields) in legal doctrine, which focuses on debates over legal interpretation and
policy in litigation and legislation, rather than on the practice of law.
The growth of strategic alliances makes this bias more troubling and also creates
new problems for both law schools and continuing legal education. This section
discusses these new problems. These demands on lawyers are not unique to strategic alliances. In family and labor relations, in nonprofit member organizations,
and indeed in all of politics, trust (or, if you prefer, risk management) promotes
success. Discussion of these fields is beyond the scope of this Article, but the
similarities make the need for change in legal education all the more pressing.
CONTRACTS AND BUSINESS 0RGANIZA TIONS

The growth of strategic alliances calls for revision of the old axiom of contracts
courses that the more precise and detailed the contract, the better. 227 Of course,
this principle has long been subject to the qualification that the benefits of a
provision must exceed the costs of its negotiation and drafting. The lesson from
strategic alliances adds a new twist to this qualification: Where parties will need
to cooperate and to trust each other after signing, the tendency of hard, protracted
bargaining over details to defeat this goal must be counted among the costs.
225. See Holmstrom & Roberts, supra note 9, at 83-84.
226. See Licensing Seminar, supra note 171, at 4.
227. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
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Another implication is that some contracts need flexibility to allow adjustment
to changing circumstances. This need is not unique. Output and demand contracts, for example, do not fix in advance the quantity of goods to be supplied
but permit one party to decide the quantity at a later date. Some sales contracts
also base price on market conditions. Again, though, strategic alliance contracts
add a new twist by introducing concern for the changing level of trust and cooperation. Of course, parties can always tear up a contract and create a new one
if after some experience they want to change their relationship. The challenge is
to provide terms (like mandatory bargaining118) that facilitate profitable revisions
without inviting opportunism.
A further implication is that the line between contracts and business organizations has eroded. Of course, business organizations have always used contracts;
a corporate charter is itself a contract, as are shareholder and partnership agreements. These contracts are quite distinct from sales and service contracts, though.
Franchises, licenses, dealerships, distributorships, strategic investments, and
other strategic alliances do not fit into the old categories. Alliances are rarely
covered in law schools today because they don't fit within traditional commercial
transactions or business associations courses. Existing courses should be augmented or new courses created to plug this gap.
NEGOTIATION

Only recently have law schools and continuing legal education begun to cover
negotiation. The new programs are commendable in part because they try to curb
aggressive bargaining. Again, strategic alliances add a new twist. Current programs
teach that politeness helps to reach agreement, to get to "yes." The final goal,
though, is still to get ones client the most favorable terms, regardless of whether
the other party learns to mistrust one's client or considers the terms unfair either
at the signing or later. Thus, for example, it is fine to withhold crucial information
during negotiations. In strategic alliances, though, such behavior may be undesirable because the other partys trust will evaporate if it learns the information
after signing.
DIVERSITY

It is now a common canard in academia that ethnic and gender diversity is a
source of strength in human relations. The popularity of this bromide is remarkable because it is transparently false-experts in many social sciences know
that this diversity is an obstacle to smooth, beneficial collaboration. People tend
to trust others who resemble themselves and to suspect those who are different.229 Thus, especially where the rule of law is weak, commercial dealings are
228. See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
229. See lEE GARDENSWARTZ & ANITA RoWE, DIVERSE TEAMS AT WORK: CAPITALIZING ON THE POWER
OF DIVERSITY 63 (1994) ("As human beings, we tend to gravitate toward what is familiar and predictable
because it is comfortable. We also tend to shy away from and mistrust what is different .... "); see
also LEWis, supra note 51, at 15 ("The potential for trust between firms is higher the more that both
have in common; it is limited by any differences.").
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often concentrated within clans or ethnic groups because their homogeneity
enhances trust. 230
This does not mean that transactions among different people should be avoided.
One reason for the growth of strategic alliances is economic globalization; transnational alliances have grown even more rapidly than domestic alliances. 231 Firms
can profit from globalization, but to do so they must realize that diversity is not
a benefit but a liability and learn how to overcome it. 232 A problem recognized is
an opportunity. Thus, la\Vyers who can build trust will be valuable, and if the
legal profession can inculcate this skill widely, not only can some of its members
reap handsome fees, but the profession itself may come to be seen less as sowers
of conflict and more as peacemakers and benefactors.
Basic principles for handling diversity are well known. First, the parties must
show each other that they share key values. Some values, such as respect for one's
partners, openness to their views and generous sharing of information, are manifested (or negated) in negotiations. 233 "We tend to trust people who confide in
us, who explain the reasons for their behavior, and whose motivations we can
understand." 234 At the same time, the parties need "[a]n understanding of [their]
different cultural norms and their impact on communication, problem solving
and conflict .... "235 "Cultural differences often cause us to attribute different
meaning to the same set of facts." 236 "[T]here is a strong tendency for ambiguous
or incomplete information to be interpreted in line with the individual's preconceptions. "237 Because contractual incompleteness is common to alliances, 238 parties
should air these differences during negotiations and agree how to resolve them
so that trust is not later shattered by disappointed expectations. Because lawyers
draft contracts, it is especially important for them to attend to this need. At the
same time, though, negotiations must not fall into contentious haggling or de230. See Donald McCloskey, Bourgeois Virtue, AM. ScHOLAR, Spring 1994, at 177,183-84 (explaining that exchange is often focused within an ethnic group because of trust); Ronald Wintrobe, Some
Economics of Ethnic Capital Formation and Conflict, in NATIONALISM AND RATIONALITY 43, 46-47 (A. G.
Breton et aL eds., 1995) ("The costs of trust formation are lower when the two parties share common
traits, such as common language, ethnicity, and so on.").
231. See AMERICAN BAR AssOCIATION, YOUNG LAWYERS DIVISION, INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMITTEE,
INTERNATIONAL jOINT VENTURES 1 (1994) ("The form and incidence of international joint ventures is
undergoing unprecedented growth as companies seek to diversify risk, penetrate new markets and
take advantage of new technologies."); john R Harbison & Peter Pekar, Jr., Cross-Border Alliances in
the Age of Collaboration, STRUCTURING, NEGOTIATING & IMPLEMENTING STRATEGIC ALLIANCES 1998, at
31, 34 (Practising Law lnstit., Corp. Law and Practice Course Handbook Series No. B-1063) (referring
to a "surge in [the! popularity" of international alliances).
232. See, e.g., GARDENSWARTZ & RoWE, supra note 229 (taking just this approach).
233. See id. at 25 (stating that there must be a "_set of shared values that clearly articulate demonstrations of dignity and respect"); see also id. at 149-50 (stressing the importance of mutual respect
and accommodation).
234. Id. at 114.
235. Id. at 25.
236. Susan Bryant, The Five Habits: Building Cross-Cultural Competence in Lawyers, 8 CLINICAL L
REv. 33, 42 (2001); see also GARDENSWARTZ & RoWE, sttpra note 229, at 46-47 (misunderstandings
often arise when parties have different belief systems).
237. Good, supra note 104, at 41.
238. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
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manding one's terms without sensitivity to the partner, both of which are common
to lawyers. 239
How these principles apply depends on context. How are the parties diverse,
and what are their goals? 240 In addition to the indispensable values of respect and
openness, business people from different backgrounds may share such values as
a commitment to high product quality and dedicated customer service. Activities
(like plant tours) that seem superfluous in other situations may help demonstrate
these shared values when the parties are diverse. Common personal interests (like
sports or music) can also forge bonds between diverse parties, which makes personal contacts between them more important than they otherwise are.
As noted earlier, 241 these goals place a premium on the parties' demeanor in
negotiations. They should eschew self-interested hard bargaining and instead cooperate to maximize their total gain and share it fairly. Indeed, diverse parties
need a distinct concept of what constitutes negotiations. They should not only
discuss contract terms in a conference room but socialize; personal contact can
always improve trust and is essential when parties belong to different groups 242
To show shared values and understand differences takes time. "[T]rust builds
slowly, through a series of shared experiences in which expectations are met, belief
in each other is validated, and individuals find they can depend on the predictability of each other's behavior." 243 Thus, the more diverse the parties, the longer
negotiations are likely to take.
Trust remains important and changeable after a contract is signed. Parties often
start small and hope over time their trust will grow so as to justify expanding
their collaboration 244 The growth (or decline) of trust depends on the parties'
behavior, including both their sincerity and competence in performing contractual
duties. Respect for the other's views, generous sharing of information, and cooperation and fairness in solving problems are especially crucial in an alliance
between diverse parties.
Even in an alliance of big organizations, trust is largely between individuals.
When new people become involved in an alliance, trust is likely to shrink unless
the parties take deliberate steps to preserve it. Thus, personal contact must be
maintained over time. The importance of the alliance and of honoring the partner's
trust must be communicated anew from each party's top management as the
alliance receives new participants.
Many of the foregoing measures for nurturing trust were stated earlier, but this
does not mean that diversity is irrelevant to trust. Rather, the specific steps needed
for trust differ when the parties are diverse. Moreover, there are different kinds
of diversity, and they demand different approaches to trust. 245
239.
240.
2 41.
242.
243.
244.
245.

See supra notes 43-46 &: 75-80 and accompanying text.
See GARDENSWARTZ &: RoWE, supra note 229, at 31-57 (discussing different kinds of diversity).
See supra notes 101-2 7 and accompanying text.
See Lorenz, supra note 39, at 207 (emphasizing the need for personal contact).
GARDENSWARTZ &: ROWE, supra note 229, at 110.
See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
See GARDENSWARTZ &: RoWE, supra note 229, at 31-57 (describing different kinds of diversity).
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This approach to diversity is the antithesis of the current academic fad of
"multiculturalism" which advocates that each "identity group" focus on its own
separate culture. 246 Transnational alliances and trade have grown most rapidly
among people who share certain values already much alluded to in this Article:
honesty, openness, receptivity to the views of others, and fairness. If the legal
profession wants to advance the role of lawyers in developing strategic alliances,
it should promote these values among its members. That will often require
retraining people who have been steeped in the separatist, identity group attitudes of multiculturalism.
CONCLUSION

Old habits die hard. The training and experience of most lawyers inclines them
to be adversarial and obsessed with details. These habits cause trouble in negotiating and drafting for strategic alliances. This Article has described these problems and shown how lawyers can resolve them. It has also discussed how legal
education should change to help prepare lawyers for this practice. By so doing
lawyers will enhance their own fees and the prestige of the profession. They will
also improve the functioning of business alliances, which have become so important to the American and global economies.

246. See generally ARTHUR M. ScHLESlNGER, jR.,
1992) (1991) (describing multiculturalism).
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